Who’d be leader of the British Conservatives in the European Parliament? No sooner had the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) been formed, with representation of eight member countries, than Finland’s Hannu Takkula decided not to join the group after all. He has chosen to remain with the Liberal ALDE group in deference to home party loyalty.

So the ECR is back to seven countries, the minimum number necessary to form an EP group and rather close for comfort. There is much debate over whether the group can survive. The 26 British Conservatives, 15 Polish MEPs from the Law and Justice Party led by the Kaczyski brothers and nine Czechs from the Civic Democratic Party form the core of the new grouping, with single members from Belgium, Hungary, Latvia and the Netherlands making up the total of 54. Seems to me it could be a rather flaky coalition.

The first test will be over the reappointment of Commission president Barroso. He is certainly desperate for the job. I’m told that he was in tears at the wind-up press conference at the June European Council, when he received a somewhat grudging, hedged-about approval.

Of course Barroso’s future is now in the hands of the European Parliament, where the EPP is keen for his nomination, the Greens and Socialists casting about for an alternative and the Liberal group divided: most UK members of ALDE are in favour of the nomination while François Bayrou’s six French liberals and Germany’s 12 FDP MEPs are against.  The Conservatives seem likely to give Barroso their votes. However, there is strong pressure to await the outcome of the Irish referendum in October before a parliamentary decision.

There is much wheeling and dealing in the Parliament.  Even with ECR support, the EPP cannot muster sufficient votes to give Barroso the simple majority he needs, so offers are being made to other party groups for the EP presidency over the second half of the five year mandate beginning in 2012. (The EPP will fill the post for the first 2 ½ years).

Matters are likely to come a head on July 9, when the conference of presidents is to decide on the timing of the vote for Commission president. If they opt for a July 15 vote, Barroso is probably home and dry. If not, then everything is to play for.

The end of a Commission mandate is always a difficult time, as political manoeuvring completely upstages the making of policy. This time it could be worse than ever, yet there are big decisions to be taken over the next six months, including response to the economic crisis and the Copenhagen conference on climate change. It will all be quite a challenge for the incoming Swedish presidency.

People have been grumbling over the last year or so that Barroso’s presidency of the European Commission has been too much influenced by hope of a second term, and that he has leant over backwards not to upset the big member states. I’m not convinced of the evidence for that, but the Commission president has certainly been put on the spot now.

The European Council is expected to give its provisional endorsement for Barroso’s reappointment later this week, but President Sarkozy has threatened that this decision is conditional on the candidate’s good behaviour. Indeed, the French president says that the appointment might need further confirmation after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, when ratification in the European Parliament would require a majority of members and not just a simple majority of those voting.

When Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel gave their conditional approval to Barroso on June 11 they were speaking from a position of strength following their strong showing in the European Parliament elections, in dramatic contrast to British prime minister Gordon Brown who could hardly be weaker and whose party suffered a bitter defeat in the polls.

So what does Sarkozy want? Tighter regulation of financial markets for one thing, with stricter regulation, for instance of hedge funds, derivatives markets and rating agencies. He wants policies which at least purport to show that the era of Anglo-Saxon dominance of these markets, which many perceive as the root cause of the recession, has been weakened for good.

Commission proposals based on the Larosière Report may not go far enough for Sarkozy, although the Brits are fiercely opposed to giving responsibility to the European Central Bank for the European Systemic Risk Council, while firms in the City of London run an intense campaign claiming that new rules will impose unacceptable constraints on their business and force them to move outside the EU.

The broader concern of the French president will relate to the nominations and portfolios of commissioners.  The internal market job, including financial services, is a key one. Competition policy is another. Neither Charlie McCreevy nor Neelie Kroes are favourites of Sarkozy. Barroso will have to tread carefully in selecting candidates for a new college.

The approach of the newly elected European Parliament raises other doubts. Will MEPs choose to await ratification of Lisbon before endorsing anyone as Commission president? Will Barroso achieve the simple majority he needs if there’s a July vote? And where will the Conservatives stand with their 25 GB plus two Ulster seats? If they don’t vote for Barroso, for whom will they vote?
The Conservative position could be especially crucial in the debates over the new financial services legislation, when the Commission’s new proposals come to the Parliament during the forthcoming autumn and through 2010.

As a group outside the EPP the Conservatives are likely to forfeit any influence they might have had in shaping policy towards light touch regulation – an influence which was extremely strong in the previous Parliament.  There will no doubt be those within the EPP who will be inclined towards tougher regulation. Without the presence of the Conservatives their views may well prevail, carrying the group with them. It would certainly be a strange irony if the defection of the Conservatives from the EPP played directly into the hands of the French President!

Just a week to go before European elections, and British prime minister Gordon Brown launches his personal manifesto. It is our task, he says, to persuade people that millions of new jobs will depend on higher levels of co-operation between EU members. He calls for a European growth strategy and advocates a much enhanced role for the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He says that he has spoken to President Barroso about apprenticeships.

For Gordon Brown it is a forthright message: “Britain must remain a nation in Europe’s mainstream and not in its slipstream”. The odd thing is that the PM has chosen a column in the Financial Times to make his case.  Much as I revere that esteemed paper, you could hardly imagine a less populist outlet to rally the British people to his cause. What’s more, seven days does not give much time for the message to get around.

But maybe that’s the point. The British political scene is now totally dominated by the scandal of MPs’ expenses. The whole political class is now vilified, almost to the point of witch-hunting, and any campaigning for the European elections is completely overshadowed by the Daily Telegraph’s daily diet of stories detailing the use and abuse of the expenses system by one MP after another.

The British public is furiously angry with its elected representatives and has no time for matters of policy. The party volunteers who canvass for votes have been shocked by the anger on the doorstep.

The question is: how will voters react next Thursday June 4, when the British are due to vote? The fact is: nobody knows. Perhaps massive abstention, so turnout collapses; and/or a surge of votes to the British National Party whose anti-immigrant views chime with those voters who resent the more open policies of the main parties.

The UK Independence Party could (once again) be a major beneficiary of the public mood with its Get-Britain-Out rallying call, although other parties have been swift to point out that UKIP is no stranger to scandal. A surge to the Conservatives from UKIP, which seemed a likely outcome a month or so back, now appears less probable, given the opprobrium which has been heaped on Tory as well as Labour MPs in the expenses scandal. In normal times the unpopularity of the government would guarantee a massive switch from Labour to Conservative. These are not normal times.

Britain is in the middle of a massive political crisis, which makes its European election outcome impossible to call, but other countries will learn next week just how disgruntled – or satisfied – their own voters are in the face of the current recession.  It’s easy for me to complain about Gordon Brown’s low profile approach, but a French friend tells me that Sarkozy’s government has kept deliberately quiet about the elections, while the German leadership has simply seen the vote as precursor for the September general election.

A just-published poll undertaken for the European Parliament in early May recorded a surprisingly high interest in the elections, so perhaps the turnout will be higher than many fear.  In 2004 the turnout across the Union was 45.7 per cent, part of a steadily declining trend since 1979 when it was 63 per cent. It would be good to see a newly rising level of interest in a parliament which may have greater power and will certainly face tough decisions over the next five years.

Agreement on the future president of the European Commission will be the first challenge for the 736 new MEPs when they take their seats. I’m sure that Barroso is not counting his chickens. No one can predict which eggs will hatch.

How to communicate better with the people of Europe? That’s one of the great challenges faced by all European institutions. It’s especially crucial for those who represent us in the European Parliament. When those 785 newly elected members take their seats on July 14, how will they relate to those they represent? Through speeches? press releases? newsletters? public meetings? How many will use the internet?

Fleishman-Hillard has taken the temperature in the outgoing parliament. It has just completed research  to see how the present crop of MEPs regard the internet and the amazing new possibilities which it opens up for political dialogue. FH suggests that members may be underestimating the effectiveness of the web for reaching out to voters.

The survey (to which 110 members responded) shows that the vast majority of MEPs do use the web extensively in seeking out information, both for keeping up to date with events through media outlets and for researching policy issues. Many of them use websites, blogs and newsletters to set out their views and keep their constituents informed about current developments. But all still see television and newspapers as the key media for getting their messages across.

It’s the dialogue which seems to be missing. The internet opens up vast possibilities for interactive communication, yet only 17 per cent of respondents saw digital media such as websites, podcasts or blogs as being “very effective” as communications tools. For half the MEPs personal engagement was the key and for 34 per cent it was TV and newspapers. Six out of 10 respondents had never heard of Twitter or did not intend to use it.

Of course we are talking about new phenomena. Facebook, YouTube, MySpace and Twitter did not exist at the time of the last European elections, and as the FH survey says, it is perhaps surprising that even 17 per cent recognised the potential of these outlets.

There is no question that these digital media can be immensely powerful tools, but in many different ways. When Gordon Brown uses YouTube to announce a policy initiative he is trying to reach the mass media, not to communicate with a selected group of chosen “friends”. By contrast we have Barack Obama’s internet campaign, which provided “personal” messages from Barack to the cell phones, Blackberries and computers of millions of his supporters. It was a telling factor in informing, mobilising and inspiring them to maximise the vote.

There is a generation issue too. Moldova is said to have had a Twitter Revolution, when demonstrations were organised via tweets among university students. Many campaign organisers are now well versed in the use of the internet to build support and co-ordinate action. I well recall a campaign to protect baby seals in the 1980s, when thousands of protest postcards flooded the Commission’s Berlaymont post room. Today that would all be done through the internet.

Technology will evolve during the five-year life of the new European Parliament, opening up new possibilities for interactive communication via the internet. I’m thinking for example of a new generation of television sets which will be directly linked with the web. I believe the impact of this could be profound. Watching TV is a social activity as compared with the solitary state of computer use and could turn internet communication into a much more responsive forum for the new generation of European parliamentarians. That MEP video diary could take on a whole new identity if the whole family can watch.

If you want a flavour of the political challenges we face in dealing with global climate change, then take a look at European fisheries. It’s a disaster area! We should heed the warnings it sends.

For year after year political expediency has triumphed over the evident need for drastic action to save a vital resource from almost complete destruction. The indisputable need to curb fishing effort and allow the recovery of fish stocks has been consistently defeated by short term pressures.

The European Commission’s recent green paper on European fisheries has a note of desperation about it.  It’s a discussion paper, designed to prepare the way for an incoming Commission to devise a new EU policy by 2012. Its analysis shows that up to now the common fisheries policy has been a complete failure.

It’s been known for more than 30 years that many fish stocks in Europe’s waters are in danger. That now applies to 88 per cent of species. According to scientists nearly a third of those species have dropped below the “sustainability” level at which the stocks could regenerate even if they were now to be effectively protected.

It’s a disgraceful story. Apparently 93 per cent of the cod fished from the North Sea is caught before it can reproduce.  Large quantities of fish are dumped dead into the sea (“discarded”) because quotas have been exceeded. The Commission reckons that the subsidies which several member states give their fishing industries amount to more than the value of the fish which they catch, as well as maintaining a fishing capability which is too great for the resource. Some of us are paying twice, as consumers and taxpayers.

A common policy operating across many jurisdictions ought to be ideal for fisheries. After all, fish can’t read. They don’t recognise national boundaries. They breed in one area and mature in another. Only common action can deal with a major threat to the resource. Yet this common policy has worked in an entirely negative way as ministers vie with each other to defend their quotas in Brussels and hold back from applying strict controls at home.

I know one shouldn’t underestimate the difficulties faced by national governments. They have to confront their fishing constituencies, provoking serious political backlash, disorder and blockaded ports. But surely after 30 years . . .  Paradoxically, every year’s failure to act foreshortens the future of the industry.

The green paper considers a separate policy for coastal fishing. This would apply within the 12 mile limit and would have a strong regional and social element. A policy of much stricter controls would be applied to the deep sea fleet, together with a substantial cut in capacity. This divide-and-rule approach might take off some political pressure from fishing communities, although it is not easy even now to keep the big boats away from relatively rich coastal fisheries – or to keep smaller vessels from deeper waters.

A specific policy for coastal fisheries might have the added benefit of fostering the creation of conservation areas where fishing is banned altogether. Where such areas have been designated in close consultation with local fishermen, for instance in specific areas off the Scottish and Spanish coasts, there has been a significant increase in stocks of many species – an indication that something can be done.

So where should the authority lie for implementing an effective common fisheries policy? The present system of ministerial bidding in the Council has palpably failed. The Commission could maybe do the job through a management committee system, as it suggests in its green paper, and take detailed decisions itself.  The blame for tighter controls could then be laid on “Brussels”, but the Council will be reluctant to delegate power in this way. Another possibility, also suggested by the Commission, is for the fishing industry itself to take more responsibility.

It is clear that something must be done if European consumers are to continue enjoying fish from European waters and indeed if Europe’s  fishing industry is to have any future at all. This is a major challenge of sustainability, a crisis which requires the same sort of political leadership and the courage to confront special interests which will be essential in developing an effective policy on climate change.

Don’t pile up new decisions, but execute what has already been decided. That’s the basic approach of ECB President Trichet as expressed in Sunday’s interviews with Japanese newspapers. He thinks the policy-makers have done what it takes to restore global growth, but, he warns, it won’t happen until 2010.

Some commentators had complained that the ECB did not cut enough when it reduced interest rates by a quarter per cent early this month to 1.25, but Trichet is keen to keep his powder dry. He talks of a measured pace. Another quarter per cent is possible in May, together with other “non-conventional measures”.

So what measures are they? Money markets are apparently waiting with bated breath to see whether the European Central Bank resorts to buying up corporate debt and government bonds to release more liquidity on to European markets.

This process of so-called quantitative easing, already introduced by the Bank of England and the Fed, could have some sensitive political overtones for the ECB. Where should they target the action?  Do they buy up Portuguese, Irish, Greek and Spanish bonds to help the weakest national markets, or concentrate on the biggest economies such as Germany which act as drivers for the EU as a whole? Or maybe they can buy up bonds issued by the European institutions like the EIB.

These quandaries nicely illustrate the complexities of the eurozone, where measures necessary to support the general eurozone interest could benefit one member country more than others.

Trichet has argued that ECB action to boost liquidity has already had an impact, reducing euro interest rates below those of the dollar and relaxing constraints on borrowing. He is not in favour of more dramatic action.

It seems that we are now moving into a new phase of this crisis, where governments must struggle to fight the fires of recession, the social unrest and political turbulence which come with rising job losses and soaring budget deficits, but can really do little more than hold on while world trade picks up again (desperately important for Germany, for instance) and confidence returns.

Let’s accentuate the positive! The G-20 meeting in London did achieve a much wider consensus and more far-reaching decisions than most people thought possible.  Merkel, Sarkozy, Barroso and Obama all said so. The summit was also remarkable for its recognition of the realities of a changing world economy and the ability of its disparate players to make common cause.

The G-8 is dead: long live the G-20. It would be good to think that this bodes well for an effective global response to climate change in the run-up to Copenhagen.

The Europeans could feel quite pleased with themselves. The conclusions of the London meeting delivered many of the aims which had been set by the EU spring summit and the EU finance ministers in preparation for the London meeting.

But beware of the fudge. As is usually the case on these occasions, the billions and trillions which appeared in the communiqué were not all they seemed, as the FT nicely demonstrated in its graphic. For instance, the $250bn figure to support trade finance apparently relates to the amount of trade supported rather than the cost of underwriting it, which is put at $25bn; and the much hyped extra funding for the IMF comprises some money already committed from Japan and the EU and greater borrowing in the future. The IMF will be selling some of its gold bars as well.

Will this be enough to support the economies of central and eastern Europe?

On the other hand the programme to increase the role of the new global economies in the IMF and World Bank is a recognition of the need for change, while a commitment to avoid trade restrictions provides a valuable sheet anchor to restrain protectionist pressures in difficult times.

The Merkel-Sarkozy positioning in advance of the summit and President Sarkozy’s threat to walk out were intriguing. Their pre-summit initiatives were no doubt an assertion of their independence and a way of distancing themselves from the US, particularly important for both leaders given the public resentment against an American banking system which had precipitated the crisis in the first place.

German opposition to pumping more cash into the economy along the lines advocated by Gordon Brown reflected long-standing German fears of inflation, while President Sarkozy’s threat to quit made great news coverage for him at a time when he is battling deep unpopularity at home – and just as France becomes a full member of NATO. He was able to show himself as the scourge of Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

In fact the London conclusions on financial regulation appear to fit neatly with the EU agenda agreed last month.  President  Barroso has already outlined the timetable for action.  A beefed up global Financial  Stability Board will be a valuable counterpart to the proposed EU risk assessment bodies. The European Commission will be pleased to become a member of the FSB.

Tax havens were President Sarkozy’s final battleground, aimed particularly at the 60 per cent of hedge funds which he claimed were registered in these territories. He wanted instant publication of the OECD name-and-shame list, but ran up against Chinese opposition related to the position of Hong Kong and Macao. It was President Obama who brokered a deal in the margins of the meeting, as Sarkozy himself acknowledged.

“The era of banking secrecy is over” said the final text. Let’s now see how quickly those EU countries which have still to implement the tax standard (Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg) can be persuaded to agree.

It looks very much as if early October will be the time for Ireland’s second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is certainly what the ALDE leader Graham Watson assumes after talking with Taoiseach Brian Cowen in Brussels last week. It also reflects recent comments by Europe minister Dick Roche.

An earlier vote – for instance to coincide with European elections in June – could go negative, caught up in a surge of feeling against Cowen’s government and against the background of a worsening economic situation.   Even the delight over Ireland’s rugby Grand Slam victory may have worn off by then!

Europe’s game of politics and people is now in full swing, with the result of Ireland’s new vote a critical factor. Parliament president Hans-Gert Pöttering wants the July 14 EP inaugural session to confirm the new Commission president in the light of the elections outcome, while also dealing with “upcoming legal, political and personnel questions”, which would presumably cover eventualities with and without Lisbon.

At the end of his speech  to the March 19-20 summit Pöttering said that a new Commission must be able to take office before the end of the year. He also had comforting words for Ireland.

Gordon Brown has already expressed British support to Barroso as president of the new Commission (he evidently has no doubts that the EPP will be the dominant group in the new Parliament!). Angela Merkel also seems supportive, whereas President Sarkozy wants no decision until the autumn.

Everyone has their own agenda, but it is classic French policy to make a package of the top international posts. If Lisbon is ratified, there will be two key posts to be filled in addition to Commission President: the President of the Council, and the High Representative, who will have the unenviable task of sitting at two tables – Commission and Council.  It’s no surprise that France wants to keep its powder dry.

NATO does seem to be sorted. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is expected to be appointed at the April 3-4 NATO summit to succeed Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer when he steps down at the end of July. That’s one contender whom we can take off the list for EU top jobs.

Then there is the British Conservatives’ departure from the EPP. I am intrigued to know whether this will have any impact on the balance of power in a newly elected European Parliament. Will the Conservatives vote with the centre-right bloc?

There’s every indication that the Conservatives will do well in the June poll, reversing the UKIP (UK Independence Party) successes of 2004 and riding high on the Labour government’s unpopularity. They should substantially increase their number of MEPs, although whether they have any chance of forming a new group with the required 25 members from seven countries seems highly doubtful without inviting in some dubious bedfellows.

Cameron’s confirmation that his party will leave the EPP can only be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike against UKIP and the BNP (British National Party) in advance of the European elections. That’s politics. But it will also have a self-fulfilling prejudice against selection of pro-European candidates, which I find a depressing prospect.

The European Competitiveness summit should look very different this year. The March 19-20 meeting will be struggling to finalise an EU position for the April 2 crisis meeting of the G20 in London on the basis of the Commission’s Communication.

Negotiations will take place against a profoundly uncertain economic backdrop where there are major potential risks to national economies across Europe and beyond. I have talked with old friends in Brussels who believe that the credit crisis still has a long way to run. They even talk of the need for a new Marshall Plan to rescue stricken economies. (A view which, I should say, some leaders rejected at the March 1 European Council).

“A global crisis needs a global solution. Today we have put our proposal on the table for a European response for the G20 meeting in London. Europe will speak with one voice”. So promised President Barroso when launching the Communication Driving European Recovery.

The Commission’s document plays down any sense of impending doom. Its main focus is on improved financial regulation along the lines of the February 25 report by the Jacques de Larosière taskforce.

As anticipated, this report was just what the client (ie the Commission) ordered: a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) based on the ECB which would provide early warning of supervisory risk, a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to beef up supervision at the level of firms, extended regulation in areas of financial services which are currently unregulated and action to control the bonus culture of banks.

The main difference from the Larosière proposals is an increased urgency: the measures should be up and running in 2010, rather than over a three-year run-in period.

It’s my impression that the member states will broadly approve the proposals on financial supervision, although the Brits and other non-eurozone countries can be expected to oppose such a significant role for the European Central Bank. In any event, the EU will be determined to retain European control over prudential issues, albeit in the context of global co-ordination, and not cede power to others.

Dealing with these supervisory issues is all well and good, but essentially deals with past failures and the need to avoid them in future. Is that a sufficiently ambitious position for Europe at the G20?  The challenge now is to get the world economy going again. The Communication sees the €400bn European Economic Recovery Plan providing co-ordinated stimulus to Europe’s economy, but much of that is a repackaging of existing funds and most of the funding comes from the member states themselves.

The Commission “remains committed” to working with European and international financial institutions to support the economic stability and development of potential EU candidates and neighbouring countries.

In outlining an EU position for the G20 the Commission defends free trade and global development. I just wonder whether enough attention is devoted to the concerns of the G12 – those like Argentina, Brazil, China and India which have joined the G8.  At least there are calls for reform in the governance of the IMF and the World Bank, a temporary doubling of IMF resources and strengthening of its surveillance role. That does seem to recognise a global dimension.

In the next few days the European Commission will tell us how Europe’s regulatory regime for financial services should be reformed in the aftermath of the credit crisis. As a starting point the Commission has the report from Jacques de Larosière’s taskforce, which was commissioned by President Barroso last October and published earlier this week.

No doubt this report will give comfort to the Commission, for it spells evolution not revolution, recognises the limited competence of EU institutions in financial supervision and does not seek to impose new pan-European powers for regulating the sector. It will be a useful antidote against those (including governments) who want a much more aggressive approach to financial services regulation.

Alan Greenspan recently admitted that as chairman of the Fed his basic assumption was that the self interest of banks and bankers ensured that they would never do anything which ran counter to their own long-term commercial advantage. This assumption was key to Greenspan’s light-handed approach to regulation, as it was for most governments and regulators across the globe.

How wrong they were! The general assumption these days seems to be quite the opposite. That’s hardly surprising, given the fine mess which financial engineering has got us into. Both the regulators and the practitioners failed because each depended on the other.

Just take the example of the individual misjudgements revealed in the $50bn collapse of the Madoff funds. Investment firms trusted the regulators to guarantee compliance, while the regulators trusted the investors to do their due diligence. (How Charles Dickens would have jumped at the chance to create a Mr Madoff as one of his characters!).

Everyone is now seeking a new model for financial supervision and regulation. President Obama is pressing Congress to approve a tougher regulatory framework to protect consumers and investors; the April G-20 meeting in London will discuss a stricter global regulatory regime; and Europe is wrestling with the perennial question: should financial regulation be managed nationally or at the European level?

Lamfalussy and the Financial Services Action Plan sought to close this argument, constructing a sharing of the burden between EU legislation and national implementation. Jacques de Larosière’s taskforce goes down a similar road. It rejects the idea of a pan-European regulator, but would create a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) chaired by the ECB president and consisting of the ECB general council, one Commissioner and the chairs of each pan-EU committee on banking, insurance and investment services.

The ESRC’s fundamental task would be “macro-prudential supervision” – essentially to keep an eye on the big picture (but not the regulation of individual firms) and to warn of troubles ahead. It might bring the ECB closer to the heart of economic policy making, with enhanced influence, but no teeth as far as I can see.

At the level of individual firm supervision, a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) would give a stronger European dimension to the activities of national regulators, although it would still be the competent authorities of member states which retained the power to act, subject to the FSAP legislation. There is an interesting contrast with European competition policy, where the anti-trust powers of the Commission provide the backing to ensure coherence between national authorities in the European Competition Network.

De Larosière’s report is no root-and-branch reform. It advocates greater co-ordination and co-operation but no real transfer of power. It recommends that supervision should be extended to those currently unsupervised financial institutions with “potential systemic risk” such as some hedge funds, more clarity for dealing with cross-border banking failure (the Fortis case), greater national supervision of credit agencies and a big commitment to the IMF for dealing with the global context.

In his introduction to the report De Larosière sets out the choice:  “chacun pour soi” beggar-thy-neighbour solutions; or the second – enhanced, pragmatic, sensible European co-operation for the benefit of all to preserve an open world economy” . Barroso described the report as “balanced and rich” which I guess makes it a good trailer for the Commission’s forthcoming proposals.