Europe is once again facing an external crisis which will require the most skilful handling. It concerns the future of Kosovo, seedbed of the Balkan wars some 15 years ago. On November 17 a general election in the province reinforced the demand for independence – unilateral if necessary. December 10 is the deadline for the international community to take a decision on the province’s future.

The conflicts of the early 1990s in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse remain an awful memory, an indictment of Europe’s inability to deal with a major crisis on its own doorstep. Some 100,000 people were killed and millions displaced. Those TV reports from Mostar, Sarajevo and Srebrenica will stay long in the memory. How could we let it all happen, and be so impotent?

It was only the intervention of the United States which ultimately brought a kind of peace to the region, culminating in the NATO action against Milosevic for his programme of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians.

Europe has responded to the challenge. I believe that the EU can take much of the credit for bringing stability to the region over last 10 years. It has deployed its economic and peace-making capabilities effectively, has shepherded Macedonia (sorry, FYROM) through threats of civil war and has used the prospect of partnership and ultimately EU membership to bring about political and social change across the region.

But the forces which drive politics in the Balkans are dark and deep. Serbs will tell you that Kosovo is to them what Jerusalem is to the Jews. For them any prospect of Kosovo independence brings talk of war, while in Kosovo itself there are threats that the guns will come out if independence is not granted.

The US favours independence, while the Russians are fiercely defending the Serb position and demand a UN solution (where they have a veto). Can the Europeans stand together in their positioning? They have made a commitment to do so, but clearly there are differences of opinion. The Brits and French may recognise an independent Kosovo, but others are worried about what their own ethnic minorities might be tempted to do. How about the Turks in Cyprus, the Albanians in Greece or the Basques?

A proposal from the EU envoy for Kosovo, Wolfgang Ischinger, that a decision on the status of Kosovo should be shelved, has received short shrift from both sides.

It seems that the Commission is playing the partnership/membership card as strongly as it can. Commissioner Olli Rehn signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia on November 7, with its promise of financial assistance and closer links with EU on the path to membership. This could be ratified by member countries in January, but one can imagine certain delays if the Serbian government kicks up rough over Kosovo.

Russian President Putin is the hero of many Serbs, who see him as their champion over the Kosovo issue, some even hoping that the Russians would consider military intervention on their behalf. As Putin increases the rhetoric and employs gestures such as the stand-off on over-flying of Siberia to demonstrate that Russia is a great power again, Balkans policy will be a here-and-now indicator of his real thinking.

I must say, the future of energy supply is an escalating issue in EU-Russia relations, especially in light of the reciprocity provisions in the latest energy proposals. The Commission reckons that half of Europe’s gas will come from Russia by 2030 – double the current proportion, while state-owned Gazprom is looking for partners like Eon to strengthen its position in the European market. A fascinating study by Capgemini warns of trouble ahead.

We talk as if Russia holds all the cards on energy supply, but I was struck by estimates indicating that without massive new investment Russian oil production would begin to decline as from about 2015 while domestic demand is continuing to grow. So where is the investment to come from? This will surely be a key factor in the future of EU-Russia relations.

Kosovo is NOW. Turkish membership is a much longer game. I must say, the Commission’s autumn report on Turkey’s progress to membership is more positive than we had been led to expect. There is recognition of the way in which the Turkish army’s threatened intervention had been handled and the integrity of the July elections, as well as the continued growth of the economy, which has been so impressive.

The Commission is playing a difficult hand, trying the keep the show on the road while acknowledging the political reluctance in many member states to see Turkey as an EU member.

Olli Rehn is forthright in defending membership. Quite right too. Turkey has transformed itself over many decades in preparing for EU membership, while for the EU having an Islamic state as a member will be of profound importance in relating to the rest of the Moslem world and a rejection of the Clash of Civilisations postulated by Huntingdon.

A big concern for the Commission is that the Turks themselves will turn against membership, frustrated by the negative messages from those like President Sarkozy, who is now proposing a group of Wise Men to map the way ahead for Europe. See this interview with Turkish Secretary General for EU Affairs Mustafa Oguz Demiralp for more.

Just a word on the 2004 enlargement, which was a key justification for the revision of the treaties because it was assumed that an EU of 27 would require new mechanisms to work efficiently. But maybe not: Helen Wallace’s recent analysis of the impact of enlargement on EU policy-making indicates that the Nice formula has worked rather well since 2004. Far from creating gridlock, she says, it has been business as usual.

We used to describe European integration as “journey to an unknown destination”, which was an easy get-out when everyone had different ideas and nobody was sure of the direction of travel. It was comforting and frustrating at the same time.

Taking stock after the Lisbon European Council of October 18-19 and the approval of the draft reform treaty, I think we can say that at last we have arrived at an actual destination. There are certainly hurdles to jump before the new treaty is ratified, but we now have a blueprint for the functioning of the EU which should serve at least for ten years and maybe for longer. The years of crisis since the Convention began its deliberations in 2002 have been so cumbersome and fraught that I doubt whether anything similar could be undertaken for at least a generation.

Of course the earlier version was called a Constitutional Treaty precisely to give a sense of completion and not because it was a genuine constitution, but that’s by the way. By introducing amendments to existing treaties rather than a completely new text consolidating into a single treaty it is easier to see the actual changes which are intended and – by deduction – what was already part of the acquis (flag, anthem etc).

It’s also good to see that “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” remains the fundamental purpose and we can forget the heavy verbiage of the constitutional treaty.

The most far-reaching changes relate to Europe’s capacity to relate to the world beyond: the appointment of a Council President for a renewable 2½ year term and the creation of the new High Representative for external relations who will bring together in one person the Council’s Solana figure and the Commissioner responsible for foreign policy. The Definition of a Common Security and Defence Policy in the Treaty could also be a significant step towards a more capable EU (see summary).
Kissinger once said that he didn’t know whom to phone in Europe in times of crisis. At least that should be clearer once a Council President is in office. And a High Representative will bring together the two arms of decision-making in external relations: the political will of the Council (as long as it can be found!) and the policy resources and budget managed by the Commission.

Needless to say, speculation runs rife over who will get the jobs. Sarkozy is said to like the idea of Tony Blair for EU president – but could also favour Luxembourg premier Juncker. Denmark’s Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is said to be in the running, as is former Polish President Kwaśniewski. Then there is the High Representative post, where Carl Bildt is tipped. A brief term as Swedish premier nearly 20 years ago launched him on a distinguished career in the Balkans and across European politics.

The name game will run for the next 12 months, the source of endless fun. For a structured argument for having an EU President click here.

The new Europe may not be quite what European federalists dreamed of 50 years ago, but how extraordinary it is to see an operating Union of 27 member states, including countries which were deep in the thrall of communism when the Treaty of Rome was signed.

Talking of which, it was a relief to Lisbon summiteers when Polish prime minister Lech Kaczyński settled for a seven year delay in the population criterion of a revised qualified majority voting system, rather than expressing his party’s anti-German sentiments by blocking agreement.

Poland’s elections a couple of days after the summit seemed to represent a significant generational shift. Turnout was relatively high, at 54 per cent, and Civic Platform, with a distinctly forward-looking agenda, took 208 seats against Kaczyński’s 164. A coalition has since been put together by the Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk which may be strong enough to stand up to President Jaroslaw Kaczyński, twin brother of the outgoing PM, in post as president until 2010.
Tusk’s campaigning took him to the UK and Ireland, where at least 700,000 Poles are now working, to gather the votes of expatriates – now there’s a European dimension for you! This constituency delivered valuable votes which it seems were telling in the final results.

Poland shares an opt-out with the UK on the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the draft reform treaty, but I gather that the new government may well decide to sign up to the Charter as symbolic of the new government’s commitment to European values, leaving the UK as the only member state left outside, with the consequent loss of influence this will entail.

Still, this was deemed a vital “red line” for the Brits, giving Prime Minister Gordon Brown a further justification for refusing a referendum in the face of a ferocious campaign in favour of a referendum in the British press.

Any enthusiasm Brown may have had for calling a general election after the October party conferences were no doubt further cooled by the threat to the 62 Liberal Democrat MPs in Westminster; if a chunk of those seats had gone to the Tories it would have made it all the more difficult to avoid a referendum.

For a recent update, including comments by Giscard d’Estaing on the treaty click here.

Portugal seems to be having a good presidency. The EU-Russia summit in Lisbon on October was described as “constructive” by both sides, maybe helped by the change of government in Warsaw, with the prospect of a deal on Polish meat exports (currently banned by Russia) and further progress towards a partnership agreement between the EU and Russia. There is room for a transformed relationship.

There’s nothing the Russians hated more than the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, which they saw as deeply demeaning, and the EU seem to be getting away from that patronising approach. Portugal’s long-standing respect for Russia seems to be an important factor. I always did think that the Portuguese tongue sounded just like Russian.