Archive for May, 2008

Eurovision Song Contest: the centre of gravity shifts to the East

Wednesday, May 28th, 2008

Allemagne quartorze points, Royaume-Uni 14 points, la Russie 272 points, Ukraine 230 points, la Grèce 218 points. So it was a runaway victory for the Russian entry in the Eurovision Song Contest, held in Belgrade on May 24, and oblivion for most west European entries. The centre of gravity moves further east. See you in Moscow in 2009!

Some (western European) commentators see the modern contest as a great conspiracy of political block voting, with the Nordics, the Balkans, the East Europeans voting for their neighbours and so swinging the results.
 
But it seems the reality is much more complicated. It reflects the complex ethnic mix in so many European countries. The fact that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine each gave the full 12 points to the Russian entry (as did Israel) reflects the size of the Russian ethnic population in these countries rather than any political block vote.
 
Likewise for the former Yugoslavia, with its intermixing of Serbian, Bosnian and Slovenian populations. Bearing in mind that you cannot vote for your own national entry, what more natural than to vote for your ethnic identity? Douze points for the cousins. By the same token, Turkey always does well from the German voters, mirroring its population of 2.6 million of Turkish extraction, although I see that this year Greece took Germany’s 12 points and Turkey only 10.
 
If you managed to miss three hours of the actual final, then you can treat yourself to a (brief) taster of any of the finalists – and maybe decide that the outcome was not so unfair after all. There’s an amalgam of western pop and eastern music which can work rather well – and is maybe part of a changing European identity – an eastwards shift in our cultural centre of gravity.

Serbia’s election: elation in Brussels turns to frustration

Tuesday, May 20th, 2008

Elation in Brussels at the unexpected success of Boris Tadic’s pro-European Democratic Party in Serbia’s general election has quickly turned to frustration as the Socialist Party, with 20 seats in the new parliament, decides whether to throw in its lot with the nationalist Radicals led by Vojislav Kostunica. Tadic’s party won the most seats, but not enough to form a government on its own. (Former ambassador to Belgrade, Charles Crawford, has forthright views on Mr Kostunica).

Both the Democratic Party and the Radicals are courting the Socialists. This was the party of Slobodan Milosevic, but it has greatly changed since his days, much as other communist parties of eastern and central Europe have done. Solana has indicated the EU’s acceptance of a socialist party role in a pro-Europe coalition and many members of the party see a commitment to a pro-EU government as a passport to full membership of Europe’s socialist mainstream.

I’ve no doubt there are those in Europe and the US who would dearly like to influence the outcome, but there’s probably little that can be done other than continuing to stress the benefits of integration within the European family.
 
The signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia at the end of April was an important step. But presumably a new Radical-Socialist government would renounce the agreement because a majority of EU countries has recognised Kosovo. They would certainly refuse to co-operate in finding and arresting Mladic and Karadzic which itself would block implementation of the SAA.
 
To judge by the exchange of vitriol in the aftermath of the elections, we are in for a period of bitter in-fighting and uncertainty . The prospects of a rapid move towards Serbian EU accession seem to have faded considerably unless a pro-Europe coalition can be formed after all. The outcome will be a watershed in the future of the Balkans
 
It’s not only Serbians who can’t agree. It seems that NATO and the European Union are still unable to talk to one another in Kosovo, although this is quite clearly a joint operation between the two bodies. According to a recent paper from the Centre for European Reform, the Turkish government will not allow a proper relationship to develop. CER have put forward its own ideas for bringing the two organisations together, with the Anglo-French relationship at the heart of its proposals.

Alarm bells over single market for defence-related industries

Friday, May 16th, 2008

Alarm bells have been ringing in certain European ministries. Proposals now under discussion would bring defence-related trade under the auspices of the single market and diplomats are worried. I gather that France is calling for a legal opinion on whether European single market legislation can apply to defence-related products –  just a few weeks before the French take over the presidency; an EU intergovernmental committee on arms exports demands to be consulted on the proposals; and an argument breaks out in the European Parliament because the defence sub-committee must have its say.
 
The European Commission has been struggling for years to create a single market for  Europe’s defence-related industries. A great idea, everyone agrees. Why should the defence sector – and the taxpayer – be denied the benefits of an EU-wide defence procurement market based on a common licensing system for cross-border trade?

It should mean more competition, lower prices, quicker delivery, common standards. In other words a more efficient European defence industry and better value for money.

But defence is no ordinary sector. For decades the Commission shied away from any attempt to tackle the defence trade issue. It was a no-go area – a minefield indeed.  Member states needed only to quote Article 296 of the Treaty to claim exemption from single market rules for virtually all deals with defence and security connotations.

Much has changed. A common security and defence policy requires defence capabilities which in turn require a stronger European industry. The position of EU defence companies has weakened in relation to US competitors. The cosy relationships between defence ministries and their national suppliers have faded or vanished. And the European Court of Justice has narrowed the scope for use of Article 296.

The Commission has moved steadily in building the case, but there is evident resentment in some quarters that it should be pushing its nose into areas which have until now been governed mainly by inter-governmental agreements and foreign policy considerations. What’s more, the new legislation would further narrow the scope for governments to favour certain strategic industries. I recall President Sarkozy’s commitment to protect eleven key sectors.
 
The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are working on two proposals submitted by the Commission last December, the first extending the principles of public procurement to defence products and the second outlining a generalised licensing system to replace the individual licences currently issued by member states for any defence-related export to another EU country. (For the current informal procurement arrangements see here).

The Commission’s proposals are being considered in the Council by the Internal Market group, but a note issued by the Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) reveals a deep-seated concern that foreign policy considerations are being overlooked.

Take this for instance: “The export of defence products constitutes a strong political act at the heart of member states’ foreign policy. Consequently, exports of defence products to third countries must remain within the competence of member states, both in terms of export regulation and export policies”. Tough talk indeed. COARM demands that it be involved in examining the new proposals.

The current licensing system for defence sales does seem absurdly cumbersome. Governments issue individual licences by company and by transaction for sales to another EU country. According to the Commission’s impact assessment some 11,500 such licences have been requested each year since 2003. Not one has been refused.
 
But exports outside the EU are COARM’s biggest concern.  Defence goods or components might be re-exported, maybe years after they were delivered to another EU country. COARM insists that the original country of export should still be able to impose conditions on the sale and continue to exercise control long after the goods have been sold. And it is clear that foreign policy considerations will be of fundamental concern. Just consider the sensitivity of certain sales to Burma, China or various African countries.

COARM uses the Commission’s impact assessment as its reference point and maybe this is not surprising, as the Commission’s assessment is studiously cautious on the foreign policy implications of the proposals.

The French have filed specific questions to the Council’s legal service: whether single market legislation is appropriate for armaments? Whether the EU might intervene in export of weapons to third countries? And whether intergovernmental co-operation could continue once European laws were in force? (The Code of Conduct on defence exports, for instance, is an agreement between governments).

Heide Rühle, the European Parliament rapporteur in IMCO, the internal market committee, has asked for similar legal guidance, but became distinctly irritated when the parliament’s defence sub-committee SEDE also asked for legal support – none of their business, she said. Her committee chair, Arlene McCarthy, even questioned whether the French government might be interfering with the work of her committee.
 
So there are big issues at stake. There will no doubt be moves to protect some national sensitivities, but it looks as if the new legislation will go through, and is likely to have far-reaching implications for Europe’s defence sector.

Tony Blair for foreign affairs supremo?

Tuesday, May 6th, 2008

According to latest reports, the likelihood of former British prime minister Tony Blair taking over as EU President in 2009 seems to be fading. The Independent newspaper reports a “secret” agreement between the big three, Brown, Sarkozy and Merkel, not to support any candidate for the job who does not have wholehearted approval of the other two.

Merkel is said to have reservations about Blair given Britain’s abstinence from the euro, from Schengen and from various Lisbon provisions. That does make sense when appointing a person who would be responsible for managing the agenda of European Councils for a renewable 2 ½  year term and with top-level global representative functions.
 
On the other hand the trio will want someone who is one of their own, so Prime Minister Juncker of Luxembourg would fit the bill, with the added bonus of coming from a small member country.

What kind of job will the EU President have anyway, given that the post relates only to the quarterly European summits and not the specialised councils? It is difficult to see the appointee as a major driver of policy – indeed the President of the Commission would be a convincing rival in many policy areas. More important will be the continuity role, avoiding the twice-yearly turmoil of transferring presidency between national leaders.
 
In practice the revamped Solana job of High Representative could be much more interesting and influential than of EU President. A seat in both Commission and Council, a budget of €10 billion, a clear mandate for international negotiations. Now that’s a job description which Blair could find extremely attractive.