Archive for the ‘Defence’ Category

EU appointments: visionaries need not apply

Sunday, November 22nd, 2009

We live in the age of media celebrity. So no surprise at the critical and sometimes bitter press reaction to the nomination of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, virtually unknown beyond their own parishes, as Council President and High Representative respectively. As someone said, it was like a TV talent show where the choice of the people (and the press) was ignored by the judges. If only we’d been able to phone in!

I guess there are two kinds of disappointment: from those who were seeking charismatic European leadership to force the pace of change and talk face to face with other world leaders; and from those like UKIP who wanted appointment of a powerful figure like Tony Blair to demonstrate that the feared “European Superstate” really had been born. Two sides of the same coin, in fact.

It does at first sight seem a sad reflection on the EU’s lack of ambition that it should choose people with relatively little experience at the highest level of international affairs.

The reality is somewhat different though. This is a period of consolidation. Visionaries need not apply. The European Council was looking for a president who could provide continuity in the management of its business, escape from the six-monthly presidential rotation (although that will still apply for the specialist councils) and build longer term relationships on the international stage. By all accounts Van Rompuy seems well suited to this chairmanship role. His term as Belgian prime minister certainly demonstrated considerable political skills.

It strikes me that creation of the European External Action Service led by the High Representative could be much more far-reaching in its impact than the presidential appointment. Catherine Ashton will have a formidable task, but one with great potential – to “conduct” the Union’s common foreign and security policy and defence policy, making new proposals for policy development and carrying out the Council’s mandate. She will both chair the Foreign Affairs Council and sit as vice president in Commission meetings.

She has to create a European diplomatic service bringing together up to 6,000 officials from the Commission, Council and member states, which for the first time will integrate the Commission’s capabilities with the foreign affairs decisions of the Council, so the trade, aid and substantial budget resources of the Commission can be used to leverage the Council’s policy ambitions. A joined-up European foreign policy at last!

Who knows whether this institutional change will transform Europe’s role in the world as it should, using the soft power policies implemented by the Commission to achieve broader political goals and moving beyond foreign-policy-by-press-release (with all respect to the great efforts made by Solana).

Let’s take one region – the Middle East. The European Commission has for years provided the funding to keep the Palestinian Authority alive, yet the Council has developed no coherent political strategy, for instance on the recognition of Hamas after its success in the Gaza elections and the question of Jewish settlements. It’s time that Europe became an equal partner of the United States in such issues.

There is a host of areas where a stronger EU policy must be developed if Europe’s influence in the world is not to decline further in the face of major shifts in economic and political power across the globe. There is need for a European voice in NATO, much stronger co-ordination of policy within the United Nations and other international organisations and coherent European policies towards China, Russia and others.

In other words there is huge amount for Rompuy and Ashton to do, but they will only make progress if the member states accept the need for a concerted EU approach to the external problems which the Union faces and are willing to toughen up policy vis a vis the rest of the world.

Leadership needed for Europe’s foreign policy

Monday, October 19th, 2009

A fundamental purpose of the Treaty of Lisbon is to make the European Union an effective force in the modern world, a global player with a power and influence far greater than the sum of its parts. The appointment of a High Representative bestriding Commission and Council, served by the European External Action Service (EEAS), is designed to provide the institutional framework to achieve this aim, in conjunction with the new Council President.

But will the member states appoint people capable of fulfilling such high ambitions? and how much power will governments be willing to concede in making the new system work? In particular how will, say, France and the United Kingdom approach the challenge, given their highly active foreign service and foreign policy traditions? Remember President Sarkozy and Georgia? Who will speak for Europe in the future?

The rumour mill is working overtime as we await the Klaus signature on the Treaty. The Council President could be an effective bureaucrat or a political driver, male or female, from big country or small. Ireland’s Mary Robinson is one possibility for the presidential job. Tony Blair? I don’t think so, given the UK’s absence from the euro, Schengen etc and Blair’s record with Bush. The Netherlands’ Balkenende could run strongly for the High Representative job. It’s fun to speculate, but no one seems to have any real idea.

It does matter who gets the job of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The external relations aspects of the Treaty imply far-reaching change within the EU institutions. Over the next two or three years thousands of officials will be brought together from the Council Secretariat, from the external services of the Commission and from the member states to form the EEAS,  a separate entity to handle the EU’s relations with the outside world. Great leadership qualities will be essential to build an effective service.

There will be some fierce institutional battles before there are any diplomatic ones. On Thursday October 22 MEPs will vote on the Elmar Brok report which outlines the parliamentary view of the EEAS and insists that the service should be clearly affiliated to the Commission and funded from its budget. This would give Parliament a direct say which it would be denied if EEAS and its funding were to be hived off to the Council. ALDE member Andrew Duff warns of a block on the new Commission appointments if the EP does not get its way. So it’s clear that the institutional wrangling is by no means over.

The scale of the changes ahead is considerable. It seems that more than 5,000 people could be transferred from the Commission alone – a fifth of its total complement. They may continue to work in the building where they are now, probably the Charlemagne, but they will no longer be Commission officials (although remaining EU officials). Trade, development and enlargement will remain the Commission’s direct responsibility, but even these departments will be expected to work closely with EEAS.

The European Commission’s 125 or so delegations across the world, plus the Council’s liaison offices, will become European Union embassies, with responsibility for co-ordinating and implementing European policies in their territory. Up to now it has been the embassy of the member state holding the Council Presidency which had this role (or a caretaker embassy in the absence of a national representation). Many officials of the EEAS will be recruited as “temporary agents” from national governments, to serve in the representations and in Brussels.

I gather that the Swedish presidency, COREPER ambassadors in Brussels and the Commission are working intensively to work out the appropriate structure for EEAS. It will then be up to the High Representative, once appointed, to make a formal proposal to the Council in consultation with MEPs and with the “consent” of the Commission as to how the new organisation will function. It looks as if the HR/VP will be appointed before the new Commission has taken over, in which case the current commissioner from that country would stand down. Whoever takes the post will have a formidable task ahead.

Europe’s game of people and politics in full swing

Sunday, March 22nd, 2009

It looks very much as if early October will be the time for Ireland’s second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is certainly what the ALDE leader Graham Watson assumes after talking with Taoiseach Brian Cowen in Brussels last week. It also reflects recent comments by Europe minister Dick Roche.

An earlier vote – for instance to coincide with European elections in June – could go negative, caught up in a surge of feeling against Cowen’s government and against the background of a worsening economic situation.   Even the delight over Ireland’s rugby Grand Slam victory may have worn off by then!

Europe’s game of politics and people is now in full swing, with the result of Ireland’s new vote a critical factor. Parliament president Hans-Gert Pöttering wants the July 14 EP inaugural session to confirm the new Commission president in the light of the elections outcome, while also dealing with “upcoming legal, political and personnel questions”, which would presumably cover eventualities with and without Lisbon.

At the end of his speech  to the March 19-20 summit Pöttering said that a new Commission must be able to take office before the end of the year. He also had comforting words for Ireland.

Gordon Brown has already expressed British support to Barroso as president of the new Commission (he evidently has no doubts that the EPP will be the dominant group in the new Parliament!). Angela Merkel also seems supportive, whereas President Sarkozy wants no decision until the autumn.

Everyone has their own agenda, but it is classic French policy to make a package of the top international posts. If Lisbon is ratified, there will be two key posts to be filled in addition to Commission President: the President of the Council, and the High Representative, who will have the unenviable task of sitting at two tables – Commission and Council.  It’s no surprise that France wants to keep its powder dry.

NATO does seem to be sorted. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is expected to be appointed at the April 3-4 NATO summit to succeed Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer when he steps down at the end of July. That’s one contender whom we can take off the list for EU top jobs.

Then there is the British Conservatives’ departure from the EPP. I am intrigued to know whether this will have any impact on the balance of power in a newly elected European Parliament. Will the Conservatives vote with the centre-right bloc?

There’s every indication that the Conservatives will do well in the June poll, reversing the UKIP (UK Independence Party) successes of 2004 and riding high on the Labour government’s unpopularity. They should substantially increase their number of MEPs, although whether they have any chance of forming a new group with the required 25 members from seven countries seems highly doubtful without inviting in some dubious bedfellows.

Cameron’s confirmation that his party will leave the EPP can only be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike against UKIP and the BNP (British National Party) in advance of the European elections. That’s politics. But it will also have a self-fulfilling prejudice against selection of pro-European candidates, which I find a depressing prospect.

Reassuring words for an autumn vote in Ireland?

Wednesday, December 10th, 2008

“The way forward is beginning to emerge”. So said Dick Roche,  Ireland’s minister for European affairs, on the eve of the Brussels December summit. It looks like a second Irish referendum for the autumn of 2009.

The Irish Taoiseach Brian Cowen is expected to tell EU colleagues that he will seek a second referendum in the autumn as long as some reassuring protocols can be agreed. These would deal with taxation (where corporate rates have been such a key factor in boosting inward investment), abortion (EU keep out!) and defence (no threat for Irish neutrality).

Putting a fence around Irish taxes may not go down well with those member states which dislike low corporate tax regimes, but reflects the realities of EU policy. On abortion and defence there should be no problem.

The Irish government will also call for the scrapping of Article 17 (5) of the Lisbon EU draft treaty which would reduce the number of commissioners by one third as from 2014, but I see that the Article itself provides that it can be changed by unanimity. My sympathies are with the Irish on Article 17. The Union is distant enough from the citizen as it is. One commissioner per country will certainly be unwieldy in an EU of 30 or more members, but is a price worth paying for smaller states to have someone of their own to engage with in Brussels.

Of course none of this will guarantee an Irish “yes”, but the tide of opinion may well have turned. Ireland has punched well above its economic weight as a financial services centre over the last 30 years, but faced with the credit crunch it is only the country’s eurozone membership and ECB support which have staved off an Icelandic-style financial disaster. The people have taken note.

The credit crisis has transformed the political and economic landscape for everyone. Denmark is now looking increasingly likely to hold its own referendum on adopting the euro to stabilise its economic position. And now we have Iceland desperate to join the EU and the eurozone to rebuild its economy.

So can the UK be far behind? Yes, far behind. Unless, that is, the global economic turbulence gets worse and the Bank of England no longer has adequate resources to bail out the financial services sector. I liked President Barroso’s provocative remarks noting the growing British interest in the euro, especially given his regular meetings with Gordon Brown and the curious spectacle of Sarkozy, Brown and Barroso all getting together in 10 Downing Street to praise each other’s expansionist policies and say, poker-faced, that they had no doubt Germany would join in. Chancellor Merkel is not so convinced.

As well as the Irish question and the financial crisis, EU leaders will be looking at some new dimensions in European defence policy. In one week we have seen the establishment of a naval task force to combat Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the transfer of policing powers in Kosovo from the United Nations to an EU police and justice mission. The European Security and Defence Policy seems to be evolving nicely, with or without Lisbon.

Europe prepares for Obama presidency

Monday, November 10th, 2008

After all the excitement of an amazing US presidential election, here we stand in the cold light of dawn, wondering what happens next. What can we Europeans expect of President Barack Obama? As others have pointed out, his first duty will be to serve the interests of those who elected him and not the political priorities of friends and neighbours, so we should not raise our hopes too high.

Yet things do seem very different this time. All the evidence suggests that Senator Obama will be a president who is deeply committed to a multilateral approach and who perceives international co-operation as fundamental to meeting the challenges which the US faces. His July trip around Europe gave a strong indication of his global perspective. The deeply unpopular image of America across the world causes him real distress.

Obama was careful during his campaign to avoid giving too many hostages to fortune, but trade was one exception, as the candidate argued that free trade agreements such as NAFTA were responsible for job losses and that outsourcing of production benefited businesses while damaging the interests of their workers.

A strengthened Democrat majority in Congress will not make it any easier to resist protectionist sentiment and no doubt we can expect some early measures such as support for the US auto industry – a distant echo of President Bush’s support to steel and farming in the early days of his first term. There may well be tax changes as well, which make outward investment less attractive to US firms.

There is a small window of opportunity. Over the coming weeks people will seek to breathe new life into global trade negotiations. The new trade commissioner Baroness Ashton has raised the hope of progress for the Doha Round in what I thought a rather convincing BBC interview and Pascal Lamy has offered to stay on at the WTO in pursuit of an agreement.

So will the November 15 summit in Washington open the way for trade talks as the Brazilians hope, I wonder? And will President Sarkozy speak for free trade during the meeting? Maybe it will be easier in the absence of ex-Commissioner Mandelson!

Climate change is an issue where we can confidently assume that the new president will chart a new course. Take a look at his manifesto on energy and climate change. He espouses emissions trading, wants renewables to provide 25 per cent of energy needs by 2025 and sees further investment in biofuels and new technologies. Nuclear power and energy saving also feature on his wishlist.

Europe should feel comfortable with this agenda, but faces some fundamental challenges of its own, in particular whether it can deliver on the commitments already made, without which its current position of leadership will melt away. The broader challenge is to bring China, India and similar economies more directly into global decisions. Real progress by Europe and the US will be an essential precursor of movement here.

The evolution of US policy towards Russia will be of special interest to Europe, intertwined as it is with the issue of Star Wars missile defence.

Medvedev’s clumsy reference to Russia’s anti-missile missiles in Kaliningrad (or are they anti-anti-missile-missiles?) is hardly likely to change US policy, but I suppose was intended to put pressure on the EU and to drive in deeper any wedge between the US and Europe. After all, Russia already has such armaments in situ. For Polish prime minister Donald Tusk Medvedev’s statement was political and not military.

Obama is a man who will take his time. Once in office he will no doubt weigh up the efficacy of the anti-ballistic missile system, its budgetary cost and its political implications. The Pentagon is asking for $65.5 billion for development at a time of severe budgetary pressures. Any improvements in US-Iran relations would also come into the picture. If there is a change in US policy it will be rationally thought through and set in a wider context than just providing comfort for Russia.

The Europeans are keen to seize the initiative on a reform of global economic management at the November 15 Washington summit and produced a detailed set of proposals when they met in Brussels on November 7.  The current mood in the US will certainly be responsive to tougher regulation, maybe going further than the European Commission, for instance, would want. How far a new president will respond to giving more power to international organisations such as the IMF remains to be seen. Once again the Democratic dominance in Congress will be an important factor.

Finally there are those issues such as the Middle East conflict and the war in Afghanistan. While Europeans hope for a more proactive US role in the peace process they can also expect the new president to demand greater support against Al-Qaeda. This may be the most challenging element in transatlantic relations over what promises to be a period of far-reaching change.

EU relations will test Russian intentions after Georgia invasion

Monday, September 8th, 2008

The OSCE seems to have serious doubts about Georgia’s role and there are even suggestions that the conflict was provoked by Vice President Cheney in order to boost McCain’s cause in the US elections.

Rash initiatives by the Georgian government in South Ossetia were almost certainly the trigger for the Russian action, but a trigger which Moscow had long been anticipating. The campaign was surely a far-reaching and thoroughly planned operation to damage the regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, to assert Russia’s right to dictate political developments in its near abroad and to block NATO expansion in Ukraine and the Caucasus.

The tensions had been building for some time, apparently including a mounting level of cyber attacks on Georgian official websites similar to those previously experienced by Estonia, and reprisals against Russian sites by so-called “hacktivists” who specialise in DDOS – Distributed Denial of Service, where websites are sabotaged by swamping.

It is the scale of Russian actions in Georgia which may prove deeply counter-productive for Moscow. It seems likely to strengthen the US presence in the region and will raise the level of scepticism about Russia’s good faith in its international dealings. It will no doubt give quite a boost for those who wish to build new oil and gas pipelines which bypass Russia. Much will depend on how quickly the Russians withdraw from occupied Georgian territory and engage with OSCE and EU. There is no denying, though, that NATO expansion now looks much more challenging than it was before August 8. European members of the Alliance will have no enthusiasm for extending the guarantees of Article 5 to the Caucasus.

The European Union has acted quickly with its ceasefire proposals, some strong words and convening of a special summit in Brussels, where deep divisions of opinion were papered over and a united Franco-German position carried the day.

Europe is at pains to stress that the EU makes common cause with the Americans, but its rhetoric has been much more cautious. Sanctions have been rejected and dialogue sustained. If President Sarkozy and his colleagues can make real progress in their talks with the Russian leadership, even to the extent of launching a programme to resolve the “frozen conflicts” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then that would be a very considerable achievement

Russia needs the EU quite as much as the EU needs Russia, if only to counterbalance and moderate American policies in the region. While keeping the pinch of salt to hand (and remembering the black belt), it’s interesting to see what President Medvedev had to say to Euronews in defending the Russian position and expounding on the EU-Russia relationship.

Alarm bells over single market for defence-related industries

Friday, May 16th, 2008

Alarm bells have been ringing in certain European ministries. Proposals now under discussion would bring defence-related trade under the auspices of the single market and diplomats are worried. I gather that France is calling for a legal opinion on whether European single market legislation can apply to defence-related products –  just a few weeks before the French take over the presidency; an EU intergovernmental committee on arms exports demands to be consulted on the proposals; and an argument breaks out in the European Parliament because the defence sub-committee must have its say.
 
The European Commission has been struggling for years to create a single market for  Europe’s defence-related industries. A great idea, everyone agrees. Why should the defence sector – and the taxpayer – be denied the benefits of an EU-wide defence procurement market based on a common licensing system for cross-border trade?

It should mean more competition, lower prices, quicker delivery, common standards. In other words a more efficient European defence industry and better value for money.

But defence is no ordinary sector. For decades the Commission shied away from any attempt to tackle the defence trade issue. It was a no-go area – a minefield indeed.  Member states needed only to quote Article 296 of the Treaty to claim exemption from single market rules for virtually all deals with defence and security connotations.

Much has changed. A common security and defence policy requires defence capabilities which in turn require a stronger European industry. The position of EU defence companies has weakened in relation to US competitors. The cosy relationships between defence ministries and their national suppliers have faded or vanished. And the European Court of Justice has narrowed the scope for use of Article 296.

The Commission has moved steadily in building the case, but there is evident resentment in some quarters that it should be pushing its nose into areas which have until now been governed mainly by inter-governmental agreements and foreign policy considerations. What’s more, the new legislation would further narrow the scope for governments to favour certain strategic industries. I recall President Sarkozy’s commitment to protect eleven key sectors.
 
The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are working on two proposals submitted by the Commission last December, the first extending the principles of public procurement to defence products and the second outlining a generalised licensing system to replace the individual licences currently issued by member states for any defence-related export to another EU country. (For the current informal procurement arrangements see here).

The Commission’s proposals are being considered in the Council by the Internal Market group, but a note issued by the Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) reveals a deep-seated concern that foreign policy considerations are being overlooked.

Take this for instance: “The export of defence products constitutes a strong political act at the heart of member states’ foreign policy. Consequently, exports of defence products to third countries must remain within the competence of member states, both in terms of export regulation and export policies”. Tough talk indeed. COARM demands that it be involved in examining the new proposals.

The current licensing system for defence sales does seem absurdly cumbersome. Governments issue individual licences by company and by transaction for sales to another EU country. According to the Commission’s impact assessment some 11,500 such licences have been requested each year since 2003. Not one has been refused.
 
But exports outside the EU are COARM’s biggest concern.  Defence goods or components might be re-exported, maybe years after they were delivered to another EU country. COARM insists that the original country of export should still be able to impose conditions on the sale and continue to exercise control long after the goods have been sold. And it is clear that foreign policy considerations will be of fundamental concern. Just consider the sensitivity of certain sales to Burma, China or various African countries.

COARM uses the Commission’s impact assessment as its reference point and maybe this is not surprising, as the Commission’s assessment is studiously cautious on the foreign policy implications of the proposals.

The French have filed specific questions to the Council’s legal service: whether single market legislation is appropriate for armaments? Whether the EU might intervene in export of weapons to third countries? And whether intergovernmental co-operation could continue once European laws were in force? (The Code of Conduct on defence exports, for instance, is an agreement between governments).

Heide Rühle, the European Parliament rapporteur in IMCO, the internal market committee, has asked for similar legal guidance, but became distinctly irritated when the parliament’s defence sub-committee SEDE also asked for legal support – none of their business, she said. Her committee chair, Arlene McCarthy, even questioned whether the French government might be interfering with the work of her committee.
 
So there are big issues at stake. There will no doubt be moves to protect some national sensitivities, but it looks as if the new legislation will go through, and is likely to have far-reaching implications for Europe’s defence sector.