Archive for the ‘Energy’ Category

EU must toughen its stance after Copenhagen

Sunday, December 20th, 2009

For the European Union it was a depressing end to the year! Gone were all hopes of providing global leadership at the Copenhagen conference on climate change. The EU found itself helpless on the sidelines as the US president, constrained by a sceptical Congress, confronted a Chinese prime minister apparently determined to reject any binding commitments which might set limits to China’s CO2 emissions over the next 40 years.

The Copenhagen Accord, put together at a meeting between the US, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, seemed more wishful thinking than a blueprint for the future.

President Barroso put a brave face on it, describing the outcome as a positive step, “but below our ambitions”. Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said it would not solve the climate change threat to mankind. The first test will come during January 2010 when developed countries publish their targets for emissions beyond 2020 and major emerging economies make voluntary pledges.

What will be the implications for European policy, I wonder? Instead of the 30 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 the EU presumably sticks to 20 per cent. If there is no global commitment to a plus-two-degree temperature ceiling, no binding reductions for 2050, and the prospects of soaring emissions elsewhere in the world, how can the EU and its 27 member states convince the people of Europe to make the sacrifices needed to achieve a low-carbon economy? I wouldn’t want to hold a referendum on the subject!

Maybe the next 12 months will deliver where Copenhagen failed. Maybe the experience of the world’s leaders getting together in Copenhagen will produce results. Maybe there will be progress in Bonn at the beginning of June leading to the UN climate change conference in Mexico City in December. Maybe. But for this is to happen will require fundamental change in the positions of other players.

The EU played its part in seeking an agreement at Copenhagen. It put money on the table, committed itself to more technology transfer and was willing to accept binding emissions targets, but it strikes me that the EU now has to toughen up its international negotiating stance on political, trade and aid issues. It has the institutions for joined-up external relations policies which reflect its economic importance; climate change is one of the first policy areas where these new capabilities should be mobilised.

Europe is after all a key market for the goods produced in emerging markets: we get the benefits in cheap and abundant products, but at what cost to our long-term wellbeing? The rejection of any binding long-term commitments could affect everyone.  Flooding, drought, hunger and mass migration on other continents would have consequences for Europe. EU leaders should put on the pressure to retrieve what was lost in Copenhagen.

Shock: British journalist praises Barnier

Tuesday, December 8th, 2009

At last a touch of balance in Britain’s Daily Telegraph over the nomination of Michel Barnier to the internal market portfolio, with responsibility for financial services! I guess it’s no coincidence that the writer, eurosceptic Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, was the newspaper’s correspondent in Brussels from 1999 until 2004 – the same time span as Barnier’s former term as commissioner. No doubt he has personal experience of the Frenchman’s qualities.

I mention this in the context of the furore over recent months concerning EU appointments, linked in the UK with the debate over financial services regulatory reform and the perceived threats to the City of London. Maybe the frenetic atmosphere is beginning to disperse.

It certainly didn’t help when President Sarkozy told Le Monde that the English were “the big losers in this business”, although the wave of aggression whipped up in sections of the British press over Van Rompuy, Ashton and the Commission nominees was quite a provocation, to say nothing of prime minister Brown’s own trumpeting of the Ashton appointment as a national victory in response to Conservative criticism.

It’s just as well that Sarkozy’s plan for a reassuring joint visit to London with Barnier was knocked on the head. It really would have looked like a French conspiracy.

Barnier has been calming things down. His job, he says, is to strengthen Europe’s financial centres, including London. The fears which had been expressed in the City of London were “very exaggerated”.

There has however been a shift in the political mood which is reflected in the composition of the new Commission.  The three key economic portfolios – internal market, competition and industry – go to the Club Med with commissioners from France, Spain and Italy. Free markets, raw in tooth and claw, will not be the flavour of the next five years. The drive is clearly for more regulation, especially in financial services, regulation which has to operate at a European level. That’s no surprise, given that the near-collapse of the global banking system did have Anglo-Saxon origins.

An economic double-dip with more lost jobs would put further pressure on EU policy-makers.  The challenge for the Barroso II Commission is to maintain progress in the single market, to stimulate business activity, so helping drag Europe out of recession, and to continue the liberalisation of sectors like energy and telecoms. The nominated energy commissioner, Günter Oettinger, may have the most challenging role, given the problems which German firms have with the gas and electricity packages. Neelie Kroes, on the other hand, should be in her element with the “digital agenda”.

As for financial services, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament are of course working on proposals for financial regulation which also date from the outgoing Commission – the legacy of Charlie McCreevy. These include the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board managed by the ECB and the three European supervisory bodies for banking, insurance and investment services.

There is some progress on these dossiers. It seems that ministers last week agreed that the powers of the three supervisory bodies will be circumscribed, allowing appeal to the Council by a member state which believes its sovereignty is being infringed. MEPs have yet to discuss these proposals.

Meanwhile the treatment of hedge funds and private equity remains a highly contentious issue which may run well into next year – perhaps beyond a British general election, which some rumours suggest could be in March 2010.

Can Europe provide leadership in Copenhagen?

Monday, February 9th, 2009

It’s maybe hard to think of global warming as we shiver in the coldest European winter for two decades, but there are just nine months to go before COP15,  the UN conference on climate change in Copenhagen, which may well determine whether or not the world can respond to a threat to our planet which scientists are convinced will lead to catastrophic change unless we act fast.  So can Europe provide the leadership in Copenhagen?

The European Parliament last week issued the findings of its Temporary Committee on Climate Change.  MEPs are convinced that climate change is more rapid and more serious in its adverse effects than previously thought and set out a checklist of measures which they believe must be implemented, much along the lines of the Commission’s proposals.

Competition is hotting up for global leadership of the issue. The transformation in US policy was expounded in a recent speech by President Obama where he outlined the programme of his administration – and his conviction that the US should be the leader of   “a truly global coalition”. Europe, while rejoicing over the US conversion, would no doubt prefer joint leadership.

No issue could be more global than climate change and here lies the biggest challenge for the EU, the US and the rest of the developed world: how to secure the commitment of China, India and other advanced developing countries to transform their own energy policies at a time when the stability of their societies depends so heavily on unimpeded economic growth. There is no hope of getting these countries on board if the developed world does not move first, yet there is no guarantee that they will be willing to participate. A failure to engage them while their economies are expanding will render all the efforts of the old economies of little value.

Balancing the emissions from dozens of new coal-fired power stations in China alone will require quite a combination of cash subsidy coupled with political and economic conviction.

Hence the Commission’s latest communication, which puts great emphasis on the need for “an effective financial architecture” which would include payment of €90billion a year for developing countries by 2020.

Europe is proud of its political leadership up until now in the delivery of climate change policies, but perhaps the real challenge will be to industrial leadership. I wonder if the commitments which are being made by the new US administration to support new clean technologies will be the contemporary equivalent of the Star Wars project of a former US president. It is no accident that the huge infusion of research and development funding to the US defence industry helped to build a level of capability which has left everyone else as spectators.

Could the same thing happen with the new technologies to confront climate change? It seems quite likely, which means that Europe must build on its own research programmes. Its motor industry, aerospace, renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency models are all potential winners in world markets, but may face competing programmes of support from across the Atlantic and indeed from the rapidly evolving economies of South East Asia.

Everyone a loser in Ukraine-Russia dispute – except EU energy policy

Sunday, January 25th, 2009

The gas is flowing again. The deal signed between Ukraine’s prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 21 should at last provide some respite for all those who have suffered severe hardship from the suspension of gas supplies in recent weeks.

In the short term everyone has been a loser from this dispute.  Neither Ukraine nor Russia emerge with any credit. The economic strength of many countries in south east Europe has taken a battering in already difficult times.  On the other hand the long-term case for a proactive EU energy policy has received a major boost.

It seems that the Moscow agreement is for 10 years and includes a formula under which Ukraine will pay a European benchmark price, linked to the oil price, calculated quarterly and discounted by 20 per cent for 2009, while Ukraine agrees not to increase the transit charges for exporting Russian gas to European customers. There are tough terms for outstanding payments.

The crisis is over then, at least for now. Or is it? We are all familiar with the cold war rhetoric between Russia and Ukraine, and the archaic, heavy-handed style of Russia’s leadership, but the fierce rivalry between Ukraine’s prime minister and its president has also been a key factor in delaying resolution of the dispute.  We learn that officials from President Viktor Yushchenko’s office are now suggesting that the deal must be reopened later this year, leading to irascible phone calls between Brussels and Kiev.

“A plague o’ both your houses!” That must be the reaction of Bulgarians, Slovaks and others in south-east Europe as they contemplate the hardship inflicted on their populations and the damage which has been done to their economies.

Shakespeare’s curse also sums up the reaction of European Commission President Barroso to the crisis. He held nearly 30 phone conversations with leaders in Moscow and Kiev to seek a solution, but found that agreements were announced, then repudiated the next day.  “This is the first time in my life that I saw agreements that were systematically not implemented. That has never happened with any other partner in the world. There was a complete contradiction between discourse and reality” he said.

The public dispute between governments is more or less in the open, with each player performing in character. We know what to expect. The shadowy role of the corporate sector and the relations between business and politics is much more difficult to penetrate.

Take RosUkrEnergo for instance, the Swiss-registered Ukrainian joint venture owned by Gazprom and two Ukrainian businessmen, which has long been the major distributor of Russian gas within and across Ukraine. There is clearly no love lost between RosUkrEnergo and Naftogaz, the main Ukrainian domestic supplier. Some argue that this was really at the heart of the dispute. It was certainly an element in the Moscow agreement.

There is little doubt that the crisis will have caused serious economic damage to both Russia and the Ukraine. It has lost them millions and undermined confidence in their reliability for production and for transit. It has stimulated the search for more diversified energy supplies and more efficient energy use across Europe.

The cutting off of supplies could not have come at a worse time. This winter is proving uncommonly hard. They were using icebreakers in Berlin’s Oder-Spree waterway to clear the way for coal barges. Hungary and its neighbours report many deaths caused by the cold.  Bulgaria has threatened to reopen its Chernobyl-type nuclear power station which has been closed for two years under an EU-funded arrangement, while Slovakia is planning to bring back the nuclear plant which as part of its accession treaty was closed at the end of 2008.

Serbia said that its power grid was close to collapse as consumers were forced to switch to electricity during the crisis. The EU mobilised the civil protection mechanism for Moldova where 50,000 people were left with no fuel supplies.  All those directly affected were the biggest losers of all. But at least this crisis has identified some of the pinch points for the evolution of European energy policy.

Russia – Ukraine gas dispute: business or politics?

Tuesday, January 6th, 2009

Is it business or politics? The official EU line is that the confrontation between Russia and the Ukraine on gas supplies is a commercial dispute which does not call for political intervention.  This is far removed from the accusations of “pipeline politics” directed at Russia during the 2006 dispute.

Requests by the parties for the EU to act as honest broker have been refused, although the increasing impact on member countries led to a brief Presidency/Commission statement on January 6 which called for settlement of this “bilateral commercial dispute”, while EU officials continued to talk in Kiev and Moscow.  Meanwhile the weather gets colder.

There is no denying the commercial issues which underlie this crisis, relating to gas prices and transit costs. Gazprom has suggested that Ukraine should pay between €250 and €450 per thousand cubic metres of gas where they currently pay €175. Other Europeans are paying €500, through contracts agreed at a time of sky-high oil prices, but it seems that gas prices follow oil prices with a six month time lag and the Ukrainians are no doubt holding out for the big price drop which everyone anticipates this spring. The contract arrangements for managing transit seem totally confused.

Circumstances have changed since 2006 when Gazprom last cut supplies through Ukraine.  The Ukrainians themselves have substantially increased their gas storage capacity and so strengthened their negotiating position. Major consumers such as Italy  and France also have much larger gas reserves (although others such as Turkey do not).

Gazprom itself has to demonstrate its reliability. It is heavily indebted, desperately needs to fund more capital investment and is no longer benefiting from surging prices. In order to fulfil its contracts it is diverting supplies via Belarus to Poland as well as drawing on its own reserves in western Europe.

So is the dispute part of the Great Game whereby Russia seeks to bring to heel the former Soviet republics, using the energy weapon to secure their compliance? Russian Prime Minister Putin can be relied upon to make it as political as possible, using a televised meeting with Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller to approve the suspension of certain supplies to Ukraine. Many press reports have linked the dispute with Ukraine’s wish to join NATO and see it as chapter 2 following chapter 1 in Georgia last August.

I’m not convinced. If this dispute demonstrates anything, it is not only Europe’s dependence on Russia for its natural gas supplies (20 per cent and rising), but Russia’s dependence on its customers across Europe. The affair will certainly expand gas storage capacity in the consuming countries, encourage diversification of supply including LPG, and boost plans for alternative pipelines such as Nabucco, none of which will be much welcomed by Gazprom.

Everyone has an interest in stabilising the situation and replacing the extraordinarily muddled contractual arrangements between Russia and Ukraine with something more durable. That’s where the European Union should be applying its influence. Maybe we’ll get such an agreement by the end of this week.

Council scuppers transfer of telecoms power to Brussels

Sunday, November 30th, 2008

It seems that any major transfer of power from the national level to the European Commission for EU telecoms regulation has been scuppered by the Council of Ministers.

Commissioner Reding had threatened ten days ago to withdraw Commission proposals if ministers refused to go along with them, but the Council’s political agreement on November 27 was unanimous (albeit with abstentions by the Dutch, the Swedes and the Brits), so will form the basis of negotiations with the European Parliament. Gone are the proposed Commission veto on decisions by national regulators, the extensive liberalisation of spectrum access and the functional separation between network and services.

The Commissioner accepted the deal philosophically after what she described as a “constructive crisis” in the Council  – I suppose the political equivalent of “creative destruction”.

It was not all bad news for Viviane Reding. She did win agreement on a price ceiling for roaming text messages (€0.11 as from July 2009 compared with the current average of €0.29) and for data transfer. The price limits on voice calls was also extended by three years to 2013 and the mobile operators must switch to charging by the second.

We can forget about EECMA, IRG and ERG. Assuming that Parliament and Council can agree a compromise – which is essential if legislation is to be agreed before European elections – we will have a new friend called GERT (Group of European Regulators in Telecoms). GERT will remain a private body rather than an EU entity and the Commission will have only limited powers to contest decisions by national regulators after taking “utmost account of the opinion of the GERT before issuing a decision and/or issuing a opinion”.

The tension between regulation and competition policy has been quite a feature of the whole debate and I was interested to see that the Council states its aim to progressively reduce ex ante sector-specific rules (ie regulation) “as competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition law only”. Music to the ears of the mobile companies no doubt, but it’s still a distant harmony.

The prospect of agreement on a telecoms package echoes progress which has been made on energy liberalisation. The Council reached agreeement in October and we now await second reading in Parliament. Here too proposals for unbundling have been blocked by the Council (although Parliament is in favour), whereas the idea of a European regulator has been welcomed – so much so that Commissioner Piebalgs is pressing for an organisation with teeth.

The Barroso Commission set its sights high in its proposals for liberalising these key sectors and has been forced to abandon some of its most ambitious objectives, but at least it seems probable that new legislation will be on the books by next June which will mark a step towards more open markets.

Europe prepares for Obama presidency

Monday, November 10th, 2008

After all the excitement of an amazing US presidential election, here we stand in the cold light of dawn, wondering what happens next. What can we Europeans expect of President Barack Obama? As others have pointed out, his first duty will be to serve the interests of those who elected him and not the political priorities of friends and neighbours, so we should not raise our hopes too high.

Yet things do seem very different this time. All the evidence suggests that Senator Obama will be a president who is deeply committed to a multilateral approach and who perceives international co-operation as fundamental to meeting the challenges which the US faces. His July trip around Europe gave a strong indication of his global perspective. The deeply unpopular image of America across the world causes him real distress.

Obama was careful during his campaign to avoid giving too many hostages to fortune, but trade was one exception, as the candidate argued that free trade agreements such as NAFTA were responsible for job losses and that outsourcing of production benefited businesses while damaging the interests of their workers.

A strengthened Democrat majority in Congress will not make it any easier to resist protectionist sentiment and no doubt we can expect some early measures such as support for the US auto industry – a distant echo of President Bush’s support to steel and farming in the early days of his first term. There may well be tax changes as well, which make outward investment less attractive to US firms.

There is a small window of opportunity. Over the coming weeks people will seek to breathe new life into global trade negotiations. The new trade commissioner Baroness Ashton has raised the hope of progress for the Doha Round in what I thought a rather convincing BBC interview and Pascal Lamy has offered to stay on at the WTO in pursuit of an agreement.

So will the November 15 summit in Washington open the way for trade talks as the Brazilians hope, I wonder? And will President Sarkozy speak for free trade during the meeting? Maybe it will be easier in the absence of ex-Commissioner Mandelson!

Climate change is an issue where we can confidently assume that the new president will chart a new course. Take a look at his manifesto on energy and climate change. He espouses emissions trading, wants renewables to provide 25 per cent of energy needs by 2025 and sees further investment in biofuels and new technologies. Nuclear power and energy saving also feature on his wishlist.

Europe should feel comfortable with this agenda, but faces some fundamental challenges of its own, in particular whether it can deliver on the commitments already made, without which its current position of leadership will melt away. The broader challenge is to bring China, India and similar economies more directly into global decisions. Real progress by Europe and the US will be an essential precursor of movement here.

The evolution of US policy towards Russia will be of special interest to Europe, intertwined as it is with the issue of Star Wars missile defence.

Medvedev’s clumsy reference to Russia’s anti-missile missiles in Kaliningrad (or are they anti-anti-missile-missiles?) is hardly likely to change US policy, but I suppose was intended to put pressure on the EU and to drive in deeper any wedge between the US and Europe. After all, Russia already has such armaments in situ. For Polish prime minister Donald Tusk Medvedev’s statement was political and not military.

Obama is a man who will take his time. Once in office he will no doubt weigh up the efficacy of the anti-ballistic missile system, its budgetary cost and its political implications. The Pentagon is asking for $65.5 billion for development at a time of severe budgetary pressures. Any improvements in US-Iran relations would also come into the picture. If there is a change in US policy it will be rationally thought through and set in a wider context than just providing comfort for Russia.

The Europeans are keen to seize the initiative on a reform of global economic management at the November 15 Washington summit and produced a detailed set of proposals when they met in Brussels on November 7.  The current mood in the US will certainly be responsive to tougher regulation, maybe going further than the European Commission, for instance, would want. How far a new president will respond to giving more power to international organisations such as the IMF remains to be seen. Once again the Democratic dominance in Congress will be an important factor.

Finally there are those issues such as the Middle East conflict and the war in Afghanistan. While Europeans hope for a more proactive US role in the peace process they can also expect the new president to demand greater support against Al-Qaeda. This may be the most challenging element in transatlantic relations over what promises to be a period of far-reaching change.

EU relations will test Russian intentions after Georgia invasion

Monday, September 8th, 2008

The OSCE seems to have serious doubts about Georgia’s role and there are even suggestions that the conflict was provoked by Vice President Cheney in order to boost McCain’s cause in the US elections.

Rash initiatives by the Georgian government in South Ossetia were almost certainly the trigger for the Russian action, but a trigger which Moscow had long been anticipating. The campaign was surely a far-reaching and thoroughly planned operation to damage the regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, to assert Russia’s right to dictate political developments in its near abroad and to block NATO expansion in Ukraine and the Caucasus.

The tensions had been building for some time, apparently including a mounting level of cyber attacks on Georgian official websites similar to those previously experienced by Estonia, and reprisals against Russian sites by so-called “hacktivists” who specialise in DDOS – Distributed Denial of Service, where websites are sabotaged by swamping.

It is the scale of Russian actions in Georgia which may prove deeply counter-productive for Moscow. It seems likely to strengthen the US presence in the region and will raise the level of scepticism about Russia’s good faith in its international dealings. It will no doubt give quite a boost for those who wish to build new oil and gas pipelines which bypass Russia. Much will depend on how quickly the Russians withdraw from occupied Georgian territory and engage with OSCE and EU. There is no denying, though, that NATO expansion now looks much more challenging than it was before August 8. European members of the Alliance will have no enthusiasm for extending the guarantees of Article 5 to the Caucasus.

The European Union has acted quickly with its ceasefire proposals, some strong words and convening of a special summit in Brussels, where deep divisions of opinion were papered over and a united Franco-German position carried the day.

Europe is at pains to stress that the EU makes common cause with the Americans, but its rhetoric has been much more cautious. Sanctions have been rejected and dialogue sustained. If President Sarkozy and his colleagues can make real progress in their talks with the Russian leadership, even to the extent of launching a programme to resolve the “frozen conflicts” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then that would be a very considerable achievement

Russia needs the EU quite as much as the EU needs Russia, if only to counterbalance and moderate American policies in the region. While keeping the pinch of salt to hand (and remembering the black belt), it’s interesting to see what President Medvedev had to say to Euronews in defending the Russian position and expounding on the EU-Russia relationship.

EU relations will test Russian intentions after Georgia invasion

Sunday, June 29th, 2008

August is the traditional month for invasions. Foreign politicians are on holiday, much of the harvest has finished and there’s time to consolidate before winter sets in. So this time it was Georgia.

None of us who were around at the time will forget the August day in 1968 when Soviet bloc troops invaded Czechoslovakia to scupper the Prague Spring. On that very evening Mstislav Rostropovich and the USSR Symphony Orchestra gave a deeply moving performance of Dvorak’s cello concerto at a London Promenade Concert – a very poignant memory.

So has nothing changed? Russian troops moved into Georgia on August 8 2008, 40 years almost to a day later. But it’s not at all clear whether this was the launch of a more aggressive Russian foreign policy and reversion to an earlier model, or a justifiable response to Georgian military action in South Ossetia, an echo of the NATO campaign in Kosovo with different characters, as the Russians would claim. Truth is always the victim in these circumstances.

The OSCE seems to have serious reservations about Georgia’s role in the whole affair and there are even suggestions that the conflict was provoked by Vice President Dick Cheney in order to boost McCain’s cause in the US elections.

Rash initiatives by the Georgian government in South Ossetia were almost certainly the trigger for the Russian action, but a trigger which Moscow had long been anticipating. Its campaign was surely a far-reaching and thoroughly planned operation to damage the regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, to assert Russia’s right to dictate political developments in its near abroad and to block NATO expansion in Ukraine and the Caucasus.

The tensions had been building for some months, apparently including a mounting level of cyber attacks on Georgian official websites similar to those previously experienced by Estonia, followed by reprisals against Russian sites by other so-called “hacktivists” who specialise in DDOS – Distributed Denial of Service, where websites are sabotaged by swamping.

It is the scale of Russian actions which may prove deeply counter-productive for Moscow. It seems likely to strengthen the US presence in the region and will raise the level of scepticism about Russia’s good faith in its international dealings. It will no doubt give quite a boost for those who wish to build new oil and gas pipelines which bypass Russia. Much will depend on how quickly the Russians withdraw from occupied Georgian territory and engage with OSCE and EU. However on NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia the Russians may well have made their point. To offer NATO protection for these two countries under Article 5 would be to play for very high stakes.

The European Union has acted quickly with its ceasefire proposals, some strong words and convening of a special summit in Brussels, where deep divisions of opinion were papered over and a united Franco-German position carried the day.

Europe is at pains to stress that the EU makes common cause with the Americans, but its rhetoric has been much more cautious. Sanctions have been rejected and dialogue sustained. If President Sarkozy and his colleagues can make real progress in their talks with the Russian leadership, especially to the extent of launching a programme to resolve the “frozen conflicts” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then that would be a very considerable achievement

Russia needs the EU quite as much as the EU needs Russia, if only to counterbalance and moderate American policies in the region. While keeping the pinch of salt to hand it’s interesting to see what President Medvedev had to say to Euronews in defending the Russian position and describing Russia’s relationship with the EU.

Policy makers in crisis mode over food and fuels

Wednesday, April 30th, 2008

The surge in world food prices, oil prices at well over $110 a barrel and measures to boost the use of biofuels in the US and Europe are putting policy-makers into crisis mode.
 
It is extraordinary how this situation has taken fire in just a few months and how intertwined the different factors are. A perfect storm, indeed. International organisations warn that the rising cost of food will threaten the stability of nations, especially developing countries. Even for a country like China food inflation is a major threat to the government.  A “silent tsunami” is how the head of the World Food Programme has described the global situation.
 
The European Commission has responded with an increase in emergency food aid, just as it should, but we are witnessing more than a short-term crisis. Commissioner Louis Michel pulled no punches when he spoke to the European Parliament recently. While announcing an increase in EU food aid spending to nearly €300m so far this year, he also warned just how dangerous the international situation was becoming.

The current food price situation focuses attention on the future of the common agricultural policy. You might think that high market prices for cereals (somewhat mitigated by the strength of the euro) would reduce the need to spend European taxpayers’ money on expensive support arrangements for EU agriculture, but that’s not how French farm minister Michel Barnier sees it.
 
For him the present situation proves the need for an expensive protectionist policy. He even urges other countries to follow suit and build their own c.a.p., so everyone would aim for autarkic self-sufficiency. His German counterpart Horst Seehofer is walking in the same direction. On the other hand this particular view was swiftly rebutted by Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel who took a pro-trade stance, just one month before her proposed overhaul of the CAP.
 
Of course agricultural ministers always resist change, but these interventions suggest that longer term moves to review the future of the c.a.p. will run into stiff opposition. We can probably kiss goodbye to any hope of completing the Doha Round before the US elections. Interestingly, Brazil is making tariffs on biofuels a key aspect of its position on Doha.
 
Pressure on the EU biofuels commitment continues to build. Commission President Barroso has asked for an assessment of the impact of biofuel production on food prices and on development. The Commission press room is thick with rumours of division in the college. Some officials are briefing that the 10 per cent commitment for biofuels in transport fuel by 2020 has been sidelined, while others dismiss any such talk.
 
Among member states the British appear to be reconsidering their biofuels commitment after a national 2.5 per cent obligation came into effect. Prime Minister Gordon Brown is concerned that some biofuels do not meet the necessary sustainability criteria and may call for changes in the EU targets.

The fact is that European and American subsidies for biofuels, which were designed to prime the pump until the industry could become viable in its own right, have produced a host of unpredictable and positively absurd consequences.
 
For instance, it seems that a big chunk of Europe’s biofuel industry has been put out of action because of the imports of “splash and dash” biodiesel from the US. All you need is a tanker load of biodiesel, maybe exported from the EU or South America, add 1 per cent of mineral oil, collect a subsidy of €200 per tonne from the US administration and then ship it back to Europe where you collect further subsidy. The EU companies have now lodged a formal anti-subsidy and anti-dumping complaint.
 
The debate over GMOs is going to hot up as well. It takes on a new urgency as world food prices continue to soar and is bound to provoke some intense debate in Commission, Council and in the member states. No doubt there are risks to be analysed and assessed, but I wonder how the arguments against the use of genetically modified crops could stand up in the face of a major world food crisis and massive malnutrition in developing countries.