Archive for the ‘Integration’ Category

Leadership needed for Europe’s foreign policy

Monday, October 19th, 2009

A fundamental purpose of the Treaty of Lisbon is to make the European Union an effective force in the modern world, a global player with a power and influence far greater than the sum of its parts. The appointment of a High Representative bestriding Commission and Council, served by the European External Action Service (EEAS), is designed to provide the institutional framework to achieve this aim, in conjunction with the new Council President.

But will the member states appoint people capable of fulfilling such high ambitions? and how much power will governments be willing to concede in making the new system work? In particular how will, say, France and the United Kingdom approach the challenge, given their highly active foreign service and foreign policy traditions? Remember President Sarkozy and Georgia? Who will speak for Europe in the future?

The rumour mill is working overtime as we await the Klaus signature on the Treaty. The Council President could be an effective bureaucrat or a political driver, male or female, from big country or small. Ireland’s Mary Robinson is one possibility for the presidential job. Tony Blair? I don’t think so, given the UK’s absence from the euro, Schengen etc and Blair’s record with Bush. The Netherlands’ Balkenende could run strongly for the High Representative job. It’s fun to speculate, but no one seems to have any real idea.

It does matter who gets the job of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The external relations aspects of the Treaty imply far-reaching change within the EU institutions. Over the next two or three years thousands of officials will be brought together from the Council Secretariat, from the external services of the Commission and from the member states to form the EEAS,  a separate entity to handle the EU’s relations with the outside world. Great leadership qualities will be essential to build an effective service.

There will be some fierce institutional battles before there are any diplomatic ones. On Thursday October 22 MEPs will vote on the Elmar Brok report which outlines the parliamentary view of the EEAS and insists that the service should be clearly affiliated to the Commission and funded from its budget. This would give Parliament a direct say which it would be denied if EEAS and its funding were to be hived off to the Council. ALDE member Andrew Duff warns of a block on the new Commission appointments if the EP does not get its way. So it’s clear that the institutional wrangling is by no means over.

The scale of the changes ahead is considerable. It seems that more than 5,000 people could be transferred from the Commission alone – a fifth of its total complement. They may continue to work in the building where they are now, probably the Charlemagne, but they will no longer be Commission officials (although remaining EU officials). Trade, development and enlargement will remain the Commission’s direct responsibility, but even these departments will be expected to work closely with EEAS.

The European Commission’s 125 or so delegations across the world, plus the Council’s liaison offices, will become European Union embassies, with responsibility for co-ordinating and implementing European policies in their territory. Up to now it has been the embassy of the member state holding the Council Presidency which had this role (or a caretaker embassy in the absence of a national representation). Many officials of the EEAS will be recruited as “temporary agents” from national governments, to serve in the representations and in Brussels.

I gather that the Swedish presidency, COREPER ambassadors in Brussels and the Commission are working intensively to work out the appropriate structure for EEAS. It will then be up to the High Representative, once appointed, to make a formal proposal to the Council in consultation with MEPs and with the “consent” of the Commission as to how the new organisation will function. It looks as if the HR/VP will be appointed before the new Commission has taken over, in which case the current commissioner from that country would stand down. Whoever takes the post will have a formidable task ahead.

Irish vote launches the Lisbon end-game

Monday, October 5th, 2009

It looks like end-game for the Lisbon Treaty at last. Ireland’s two-to-one majority in favour of ratification on October 2  was a convincing reversal of the 2007 “no” vote, especially given the increased turnout, which at 58 per cent of the electorate was six points up on last time.

The convincing “yes” majority can be ascribed especially to the economic crisis and a hunger for European solidarity in the face of Ireland’s troubles, but there were other factors, including strong leadership of the campaign by former European Parliament president  Pat Cox, the specific reassurances given on sensitive subjects such as abortion, tax and defence policy, and the promise to guarantee a Commissioner for every country as from 2014.

There’s even a chance that the Treaty could come into force at the start of 2010. The Polish president may well sign within the next few days, so foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski told the BBC over the weekend.

The Czechs await a ruling from their constitutional court on questions posed by Czech senators before President Václav Klaus will sign – although it seems that the Court did already give its seal of approval in November 2008 in response to a similar reference. The Czech Europe minister is pushing for ratification before the end of the year.

Once the Court has pronounced there is a suggestion that Klaus could declare himself indisposed for 24 hours to allow his temporary replacement to put a presidential signature to the Lisbon document.

The Irish referendum result couldn’t have come at a worse time for the British Conservative leader David Cameron, just as his party conference begins. Party unity is vital in the run-up to a general election and there’s no subject like Europe to reveal the fault lines. Cameron has apparently written to Klaus, in effect urging him to delay ratification (while rejecting any “interference” in the Czech ratification process!) to give time for an incoming Conservative administration to hold a referendum.

Be careful what you wish for! The Scottish National Party is planning a referendum on Scotland’s separation from the UK. Given Scotland’s general enthusiasm for EU membership a United Kingdom vote on Europe could give quite a boost to the nationalist cause. One referendum could beget another.

Everyone is now asking Cameron whether he will still hold a referendum if the Treaty has been ratified and implemented by the time of a general election, which must be held by June 2010 at the latest. The eurosceptic wing of his party is angrily demanding a vote whether or not the Treaty has been ratified.  Klaus however remarked after the Irish vote that “the people of Britain should have acted much sooner” if they had wanted to stop the Treaty. There would be no further referendums on Europe, so he told reporters. Not particularly helpful for Cameron.

The Swedish presidency is now wrestling with the question of how to select a new Commission, whether under Nice or Lisbon rules. Under Article 213  of Nice there must be fewer than 27 Commissioners, which would leave one member country unrepresented, but one idea is to nominate the Council foreign affairs supremo at the same time on the assumption that he or she will become the 27th Commissioner once Lisbon is implemented.

Of course Lisbon does give the Commission president the task of allocating portfolios between members of the college, but there seems little reason why Barroso should not work with the member states in selection of the individual candidates and their allocation of roles. That would surely be the reality in constructing the college whatever treaty was in force.

Eurovision Song Contest: the centre of gravity shifts to the East

Wednesday, May 28th, 2008

Allemagne quartorze points, Royaume-Uni 14 points, la Russie 272 points, Ukraine 230 points, la Grèce 218 points. So it was a runaway victory for the Russian entry in the Eurovision Song Contest, held in Belgrade on May 24, and oblivion for most west European entries. The centre of gravity moves further east. See you in Moscow in 2009!

Some (western European) commentators see the modern contest as a great conspiracy of political block voting, with the Nordics, the Balkans, the East Europeans voting for their neighbours and so swinging the results.
 
But it seems the reality is much more complicated. It reflects the complex ethnic mix in so many European countries. The fact that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine each gave the full 12 points to the Russian entry (as did Israel) reflects the size of the Russian ethnic population in these countries rather than any political block vote.
 
Likewise for the former Yugoslavia, with its intermixing of Serbian, Bosnian and Slovenian populations. Bearing in mind that you cannot vote for your own national entry, what more natural than to vote for your ethnic identity? Douze points for the cousins. By the same token, Turkey always does well from the German voters, mirroring its population of 2.6 million of Turkish extraction, although I see that this year Greece took Germany’s 12 points and Turkey only 10.
 
If you managed to miss three hours of the actual final, then you can treat yourself to a (brief) taster of any of the finalists – and maybe decide that the outcome was not so unfair after all. There’s an amalgam of western pop and eastern music which can work rather well – and is maybe part of a changing European identity – an eastwards shift in our cultural centre of gravity.

New leaders, new perspectives: London boost for the entente cordiale

Tuesday, April 1st, 2008

It seems so different from the old days, when the Franco–German alliance was the central core of European integration. With new leaders come new perspectives. President Sarkozy used his March visit to London to woo the British, with a speech to the British Parliament where he paid unheard-of tributes to Britain’s qualities and set out a detailed agenda for Anglo-French co-operation.

The elegance of Mme Carla Sarkozy gave extra media colour to what was a highly successful state visit. If he wooed, she certainly wowed. The Entente Cordiale, signed in 1904 between Britain and France, has a new lease of life.
 
The President’s message was, to coin a phrase once much loved of some British politicians, that the UK should be at the heart of Europe, even implying that an Anglo-French partnership could be the new driver for the EU. One practical initiative is that ministers from the two countries will meet on a quarterly basis – presumably matching the bilateral sessions between Paris and Berlin. Thirteen French ministers accompanied the President to London.

Almost everything in the President’s agenda involved bilateral initiatives, but mostly set in an EU context. On the other hand there was little rhetoric from Gordon Brown which indicated any new enthusiasm for Europe.
 
Still, it’s a reflection of how EU priorities are changing, that even the most sceptical journalists were hard put to identify subjects of disagreement. Not even the common agricultural policy was much of a bone of contention (after all, we must learn to love the CAP in the face of soaring world prices!). Whether or not to boycott the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony seems about the only discordant item. No indication that energy liberalisation was discussed.
 
Especially interesting would be to know what was said behind the scenes about defence. Sarkozy has already indicated that France may wish to rejoin the integrated command structure of NATO, abandoned by De Gaulle in 1966, and will provide additional forces for Afghanistan, but nothing was said publicly about strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy and France’s wish for a stronger ESDP planning capability.
 
A stronger European identity in NATO may be France’s price for rejoining the alliance. This remains highly contentious for the US and probably for the British too.

On the other hand there was agreement on an Anglo-French maintenance contract for the A400M transport aircraft when this comes into service, leaving the Germans to their own devices, and reinforced arrangements for joint procurement and for pooling of helicopters, aircraft carriers and maritime aircraft in joint missions under EU or NATO auspices.
 
Certainly Sarkozy feels temperamentally closer to the UK than to Germany. There is no evidence of a close personal rapport with Angela Merkel of the sort which he seems to have with Gordon Brown and there have been specific problems, notably over vehicle emissions, over the independence of the ECB and over his idea for a Mediterranean Union (resolved in advance of the March EU summit – see Annex 1). Nor is Germany a natural partner on defence issues as Berlin faces politically painful challenges in putting German troops into combat zones.
     
In the end, though, the demands of realpolitik will determine alliances. The Franco-German understanding in not dead.

Talking of which, I note that Angela Merkel said that her CDU party agreed with Sarkozy’s UMP that Turkey should have a privileged partnership rather than full EU membership. This promises interesting enlargement negotiations when France takes over the EU presidency in July and certainly marks a fundamental difference with British policy. Another issue which failed to feature in the public pronouncements in London!

France and the UK both have relatively new leaders who could change Europe, but so do others. In Cyprus, for instance, there are signs of movement following the election of President Christofias, including demolishing barriers in Nicosia’s main shopping street. A symbol of hope, even though there’s a long way to go to unification.

I see that the new Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is threatening a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty unless President Kaczynski’s party supports ratification in Parliament. The party withdrew its support, demanding the same opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights as secured by the UK.

It seems that June 12 has been set as the date for the Lisbon referendum in Ireland, the only country to hold such a vote (unless Tusk has to make good his threat). The Irish vote will not be a walkover  Sinn Fein will campaign for a no vote; Jean-Marie Le Pen has announced that he will also participate. It promises a fascinating contest where turnout will be crucial. A no vote would of course block ratification of the Treaty: back to the drawing board.

The Kosovo crisis will test Europe’s capabilities.

Friday, November 16th, 2007

Europe is once again facing an external crisis which will require the most skilful handling. It concerns the future of Kosovo, seedbed of the Balkan wars some 15 years ago. On November 17 a general election in the province reinforced the demand for independence – unilateral if necessary. December 10 is the deadline for the international community to take a decision on the province’s future.

The conflicts of the early 1990s in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse remain an awful memory, an indictment of Europe’s inability to deal with a major crisis on its own doorstep. Some 100,000 people were killed and millions displaced. Those TV reports from Mostar, Sarajevo and Srebrenica will stay long in the memory. How could we let it all happen, and be so impotent?

It was only the intervention of the United States which ultimately brought a kind of peace to the region, culminating in the NATO action against Milosevic for his programme of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians.

Europe has responded to the challenge. I believe that the EU can take much of the credit for bringing stability to the region over last 10 years. It has deployed its economic and peace-making capabilities effectively, has shepherded Macedonia (sorry, FYROM) through threats of civil war and has used the prospect of partnership and ultimately EU membership to bring about political and social change across the region.

But the forces which drive politics in the Balkans are dark and deep. Serbs will tell you that Kosovo is to them what Jerusalem is to the Jews. For them any prospect of Kosovo independence brings talk of war, while in Kosovo itself there are threats that the guns will come out if independence is not granted.

The US favours independence, while the Russians are fiercely defending the Serb position and demand a UN solution (where they have a veto). Can the Europeans stand together in their positioning? They have made a commitment to do so, but clearly there are differences of opinion. The Brits and French may recognise an independent Kosovo, but others are worried about what their own ethnic minorities might be tempted to do. How about the Turks in Cyprus, the Albanians in Greece or the Basques?

A proposal from the EU envoy for Kosovo, Wolfgang Ischinger, that a decision on the status of Kosovo should be shelved, has received short shrift from both sides.

It seems that the Commission is playing the partnership/membership card as strongly as it can. Commissioner Olli Rehn signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia on November 7, with its promise of financial assistance and closer links with EU on the path to membership. This could be ratified by member countries in January, but one can imagine certain delays if the Serbian government kicks up rough over Kosovo.

Russian President Putin is the hero of many Serbs, who see him as their champion over the Kosovo issue, some even hoping that the Russians would consider military intervention on their behalf. As Putin increases the rhetoric and employs gestures such as the stand-off on over-flying of Siberia to demonstrate that Russia is a great power again, Balkans policy will be a here-and-now indicator of his real thinking.

I must say, the future of energy supply is an escalating issue in EU-Russia relations, especially in light of the reciprocity provisions in the latest energy proposals. The Commission reckons that half of Europe’s gas will come from Russia by 2030 – double the current proportion, while state-owned Gazprom is looking for partners like Eon to strengthen its position in the European market. A fascinating study by Capgemini warns of trouble ahead.

We talk as if Russia holds all the cards on energy supply, but I was struck by estimates indicating that without massive new investment Russian oil production would begin to decline as from about 2015 while domestic demand is continuing to grow. So where is the investment to come from? This will surely be a key factor in the future of EU-Russia relations.

Kosovo is NOW. Turkish membership is a much longer game. I must say, the Commission’s autumn report on Turkey’s progress to membership is more positive than we had been led to expect. There is recognition of the way in which the Turkish army’s threatened intervention had been handled and the integrity of the July elections, as well as the continued growth of the economy, which has been so impressive.

The Commission is playing a difficult hand, trying the keep the show on the road while acknowledging the political reluctance in many member states to see Turkey as an EU member.

Olli Rehn is forthright in defending membership. Quite right too. Turkey has transformed itself over many decades in preparing for EU membership, while for the EU having an Islamic state as a member will be of profound importance in relating to the rest of the Moslem world and a rejection of the Clash of Civilisations postulated by Huntingdon.

A big concern for the Commission is that the Turks themselves will turn against membership, frustrated by the negative messages from those like President Sarkozy, who is now proposing a group of Wise Men to map the way ahead for Europe. See this interview with Turkish Secretary General for EU Affairs Mustafa Oguz Demiralp for more.

Just a word on the 2004 enlargement, which was a key justification for the revision of the treaties because it was assumed that an EU of 27 would require new mechanisms to work efficiently. But maybe not: Helen Wallace’s recent analysis of the impact of enlargement on EU policy-making indicates that the Nice formula has worked rather well since 2004. Far from creating gridlock, she says, it has been business as usual.