Europe is once again facing an external crisis which will require the most skilful handling. It concerns the future of Kosovo, seedbed of the Balkan wars some 15 years ago. On November 17 a general election in the province reinforced the demand for independence – unilateral if necessary. December 10 is the deadline for the international community to take a decision on the province’s future.
The conflicts of the early 1990s in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse remain an awful memory, an indictment of Europe’s inability to deal with a major crisis on its own doorstep. Some 100,000 people were killed and millions displaced. Those TV reports from Mostar, Sarajevo and Srebrenica will stay long in the memory. How could we let it all happen, and be so impotent?
It was only the intervention of the United States which ultimately brought a kind of peace to the region, culminating in the NATO action against Milosevic for his programme of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians.
Europe has responded to the challenge. I believe that the EU can take much of the credit for bringing stability to the region over last 10 years. It has deployed its economic and peace-making capabilities effectively, has shepherded Macedonia (sorry, FYROM) through threats of civil war and has used the prospect of partnership and ultimately EU membership to bring about political and social change across the region.
But the forces which drive politics in the Balkans are dark and deep. Serbs will tell you that Kosovo is to them what Jerusalem is to the Jews. For them any prospect of Kosovo independence brings talk of war, while in Kosovo itself there are threats that the guns will come out if independence is not granted.
The US favours independence, while the Russians are fiercely defending the Serb position and demand a UN solution (where they have a veto). Can the Europeans stand together in their positioning? They have made a commitment to do so, but clearly there are differences of opinion. The Brits and French may recognise an independent Kosovo, but others are worried about what their own ethnic minorities might be tempted to do. How about the Turks in Cyprus, the Albanians in Greece or the Basques?
A proposal from the EU envoy for Kosovo, Wolfgang Ischinger, that a decision on the status of Kosovo should be shelved, has received short shrift from both sides.
It seems that the Commission is playing the partnership/membership card as strongly as it can. Commissioner Olli Rehn signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia on November 7, with its promise of financial assistance and closer links with EU on the path to membership. This could be ratified by member countries in January, but one can imagine certain delays if the Serbian government kicks up rough over Kosovo.
Russian President Putin is the hero of many Serbs, who see him as their champion over the Kosovo issue, some even hoping that the Russians would consider military intervention on their behalf. As Putin increases the rhetoric and employs gestures such as the stand-off on over-flying of Siberia to demonstrate that Russia is a great power again, Balkans policy will be a here-and-now indicator of his real thinking.
I must say, the future of energy supply is an escalating issue in EU-Russia relations, especially in light of the reciprocity provisions in the latest energy proposals. The Commission reckons that half of Europe’s gas will come from Russia by 2030 – double the current proportion, while state-owned Gazprom is looking for partners like Eon to strengthen its position in the European market. A fascinating study by Capgemini warns of trouble ahead.
We talk as if Russia holds all the cards on energy supply, but I was struck by estimates indicating that without massive new investment Russian oil production would begin to decline as from about 2015 while domestic demand is continuing to grow. So where is the investment to come from? This will surely be a key factor in the future of EU-Russia relations.
Kosovo is NOW. Turkish membership is a much longer game. I must say, the Commission’s autumn report on Turkey’s progress to membership is more positive than we had been led to expect. There is recognition of the way in which the Turkish army’s threatened intervention had been handled and the integrity of the July elections, as well as the continued growth of the economy, which has been so impressive.
The Commission is playing a difficult hand, trying the keep the show on the road while acknowledging the political reluctance in many member states to see Turkey as an EU member.
Olli Rehn is forthright in defending membership. Quite right too. Turkey has transformed itself over many decades in preparing for EU membership, while for the EU having an Islamic state as a member will be of profound importance in relating to the rest of the Moslem world and a rejection of the Clash of Civilisations postulated by Huntingdon.
A big concern for the Commission is that the Turks themselves will turn against membership, frustrated by the negative messages from those like President Sarkozy, who is now proposing a group of Wise Men to map the way ahead for Europe. See this interview with Turkish Secretary General for EU Affairs Mustafa Oguz Demiralp for more.
Just a word on the 2004 enlargement, which was a key justification for the revision of the treaties because it was assumed that an EU of 27 would require new mechanisms to work efficiently. But maybe not: Helen Wallace’s recent analysis of the impact of enlargement on EU policy-making indicates that the Nice formula has worked rather well since 2004. Far from creating gridlock, she says, it has been business as usual.